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Abstract 
 
     Risk assessment is increasingly used by policy makers and scientists to determine the 
safety of new technologies and how they should be regulated.  For technologies such as 
biotechnology, there is often insufficient information concerning the long-term effects of its 
applications and so accurate assessments of risk are essential.  Canada’s regulatory system is 
science-based and relies on risk assessment to make decisions about which products of 
biotechnology are safe enough for commercial application.  Since regulation involves the loss 
of certain liberties of individuals in society, it is imperative that any regulatory regime is as 
objective as possible.  Scientific risk assessment seems to be a good way to produce the 
information, which guides policy makers since it involves quantitative analysis and the 
production of seemingly objective data.  The view adopted by regulators and in current risk 
assessment practices is that objective means value-free.  Therefore, because risk assessment 
data is scientific it is thought to be objective. This is not the case however.   
     Risk assessment necessarily involves value assumptions.  Assumptions must be made at 
all stages of the production of risk data.  This does not mean, however, that risk assessment is 
hopelessly subjective.  The notion of value-free objectivity can be replaced with the view that 
genuine objectivity arises through peer review and social discourse.  Regulators can then 
acknowledge the value-ladenness of risk assessment data and the chance for bias can be 
reduced.   
     At present, the value assumptions made by industry, government and private scientists 
during risk assessment go largely unnoticed yet have an effect on the outcome of regulatory 
decisions.  Such assumptions must be recognized in order to ensure that the decisions made 
about the risks society face are not biased.  This is particularly true in the case of 
biotechnology regulation.  The development of the science of biotechnology has occurred 
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concurrently with the development of the biotech industry.  The existence of this 
biotechnology-industry complex creates the opportunity for industry-biased risk assessments 
since current regulatory practices require proponents to produce the risk data evaluated by 
regulators.  All members of society will face the risks associated with biotechnology, 
however, because the release of transgenic organisms involves risks that transcend 
geographical and temporal boundaries.  Regulatory decisions must be based on genuinely 
objective risk assessment data.  
     It is possible to make changes to the existing regulatory regime in Canada in order to 
avoid some of the major problems associated with unrecognized value assumptions in risk 
assessment.  A complete restructuring of the regime is unnecessary, however.  Maintaining 
the current regulatory structure with some minor changes could address these problems.  
These changes include: creating an independent review board, making explicit that value 
assumptions are part of risk assessment in government advisory reports, and enhancing the 
role of regulators.  The benefits of biotechnology are unprecedented as are the risks.  
Canada's regulatory system can better address the risks associated with biotechnology if it 
acknowledges that risk assessment is value-laden.    
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 1. Introduction 
 
     A risk is the possibility that some adverse consequence such as a loss or harm will occur.  
Risks occur frequently, thus making the concept of risk a familiar one.  It is often thought that 
describing a risk is describing a fact about the world, but this is not the case.  The concept of 
risk is evaluative rather than merely descriptive.  Risk always involves value assumptions.  
The degree of severity, character and even identification of a risk can vary from one person to 
another according to the value assumptions that person has made.  
     There are myriad sources of risk ranging from improperly tied shoelaces to harmful rays 
from the sun. Advances in science and technology have led to great improvements in the 
quality of life but they have also exposed us to new risks.  Many new developments in these 
fields require a certain level of expertise or knowledge in order to understand the risks 
associated with their effects.  Scientific risk assessment is used to characterize the extent of 
risk associated with a particular technology.   
     Risk assessment is the process of determining the likelihood and extent of harm caused by 
a technology, process or product.  It involves quantitative analysis of data in order to assign a 
probability to the occurrence of an unwanted or harmful effect.  Regulation of a new 
technology depends on risk assessment data to determine whether its products are safe 
enough for use.  Nothing is completely risk-free so standards of "acceptable" risk are set.  
Scientific risk assessment is thought to be a good way to produce objective data, where 
"objective" is taken to mean "value-free". Since regulation involves the loss of certain 
freedoms by members in a society, it is important that the data used is as objective as 
possible.  Risk, however, is evaluative and cannot be applied in an objective way if it is 
understood in this sense.  Therefore, it seems that the whole business of risk assessment is 
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hopelessly subjective.  This is only the case, however, if we accept the idea that objective 
means value-free, which is the view assumed in current risk assessment practices and by 
regulators.  As a result, value assumptions inherent to the assessment of risk go largely 
unrecognized. 
     This limited characterization of objectivity should be rejected because it requires complete 
observer-independence.  The notion of value-free objectivity can be replaced with a more 
realistic account.  Longino suggests that genuine objectivity is the outcome of a social 
process that must have certain features such as shared standards, peer review and a diversity 
of viewpoints (Longino 181).  If risk assessment is to be genuinely objective, it must answer 
to this enriched and more accurate notion of objectivity.   
     Failing to recognize that risk assessment is not inherently objective (as in value-free), is 
problematic for a regulatory system that uses the assessment of risk to make critical decisions 
about safety. It allows the incorporation of values throughout the production of risk data to go 
unnoticed.  Since regulation affects all members of society, it is necessary to at least attempt 
to make sure these values are representative of as many as possible, if not all, citizens.1  Thus, 
it is important to make sure decisions, which restrict our ability to govern ourselves 
individually, are made on genuinely objective data.  Thompson asserts, 
One fact of postmodern society is that decisions by a few individuals to develop and 
disseminate new technologies can have enormous impact upon society as a whole.  
Although there are many instances where these impacts are predominantly beneficial, 
there are few, (if any) occasions on which they are universally so (Thompson 1998 
143).   
 
Genuinely objective risk assessment is necessary for new technologies, such as 
biotechnology, because it is the primary source of safety data used in regulation. 
     Biotechnology is a relatively new science with the potential to benefit all of society.  The 
products of biotechnology have innumerable applications and significant market potential.  
                                                 
     1 For further discussion see Sass 135-138. 
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Transgenic science produces genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which include plants, 
animals and microorganisms.  The risks associated with the release of these organisms, 
however, could involve hazards of an unprecedented scale. Once released into the 
environment, GMOs cannot be recalled.  Their behaviour outside the laboratory is largely 
undetermined and unpredictable, making some of the risks associated with biotechnology 
unknown.  The technology to transfer genes from one organism to another has only been 
available since the early 1970s, so there is a very limited base of knowledge and experience 
to draw upon concerning the effects these organisms will have on the environment.  When it 
comes to assessing the risks of biotechnology, the newness of transgenic science means that 
there is often no real world data to calculate potential risk.  Risk must therefore be assessed 
using subjective probabilities assigned by experts.  Despite this necessary subjectivity, 
regulators in Canada, for instance, maintain the view that risk assessment is value-free. 
     In Canada biotechnology regulation is based on scientific risk assessment.  The company 
or scientist who develops a genetically modified product produces risk data, which is then 
submitted for review by regulators.  There is little or no acknowledgement that the production 
of risk data involves value assumptions.  Therefore the values influencing the risk 
characterization of a product are typically those of the product proponent.  This is of 
particular concern in the case of biotechnology.  From the emergence of transgenic science 
just over thirty years ago, it was widely recognized that the products of biotechnology could 
be very profitable.  The development of the science occurred concurrently with the 
development of the business of biotechnology which has created a biotechnology-industry 
complex.  Advances in transgenic science and product development are in large part driven 
by biotech corporations.  These corporations cannot, of course, release their products without 
going through the regulatory process and the Canadian system of regulation requires that 
corporations conduct risk assessments of each product submitted for review.  Risk 
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assessments involve value assumptions however, and the values incorporated in these 
assessments are those of the corporations.  It is unlikely that these values are representative of 
all Canadians, yet all Canadians will be subject to the risks associated with the approved 
products.  
     The untenable notion of objectivity as value-free should be discarded and replaced with an 
enriched understanding of genuine objectivity, which arises out of social discourse.  Value-
laden risk assessment is less problematic when objectivity is thus understood because genuine 
objectivity requires peer review and discussion from a variety of people with differing 
backgrounds.  In the regulation of biotechnology, genuine objectivity is less likely to result in 
industry-biased risk data.     
     In Chapter Two I discuss the philosophical nature of risk to show that value assumptions 
are endemic to assessments of risk.  I also explain why it is necessary to discard the 
unrealistic ideal of objectivity in science and risk assessment and offer a different, more 
useful account of objectivity.  Objectivity understood as the product of peer review and social 
discourse allows for the value-ladenness of risk assessments while mitigating unacceptable 
bias.  Incorporating a number of different assessments from within the scientific community 
into risk assessments provides a way of producing the objectivity we want guiding policy 
decisions. 
     In Chapter Three I discuss biotechnology and the unique set of risks associated with it.  
My emphasis will be on agricultural biotechnology specifically.  Although most of the 
comments I make do pertain to biotechnology in general, I have chosen to focus primarily on 
agricultural products and applications because these products directly affect all members of 
society and currently there is significant debate about their use.  Risk assessment is 
particularly crucial to the development and regulation of biotechnology because our 
knowledge in this field is so limited and our understanding of how transgenic organisms 
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interact in the environment is often based on risk data.  The co-evolution of biotechnology 
with the biotech industry has greatly influenced the direction of development in transgenic 
science.  The biotechnology-industry complex and the unprecedented commercial potential of 
transgenic products result in industry-biased risk assessments.  Canada’s current regulatory 
system fails to acknowledge that risk assessments are value-laden and so this bias is not 
addressed during the process of regulatory approval.  Changes to the system over the last five 
years have further exacerbated this problem since the government relies almost solely on the 
product’s developer, or corporations to produce risk data.     
     In Chapter Four I discuss three case studies, which demonstrate the effects value-
ladenness can have on both the process of risk assessment and on the regulatory process.  All 
three of these cases involve the regulation of agricultural products in Canada through the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA).  The approach of the CFIA typifies that taken by 
the other regulatory agencies in Canada, however.  The first case, which involves the 
controversy surrounding the use of a chemical herbicide called Alachlor, provides an 
example of how different value assumptions made in the laboratories of assessors affect the 
outcome of risk assessments.  In the second case, which concerns the regulation of 
recombinant growth hormone in the US and Canada, value assumptions influenced by the 
political and economic climate also affected the risk data that regulators relied on to 
determine this product’s safety.  The last case I discuss describes the current application by 
Monsanto for the approval of GM wheat.  Current developments and controversy in this case 
demonstrate that Canada’s system of regulation does not account for value assumptions in 
risk assessment despite the lessons we might have learned from the first two cases. 
     In the final chapter I offer three recommendations for improving regulation of 
biotechnology and biotechnology products in Canada.  These recommendations require the 
adoption of a more useful idea of objectivity in science and risk assessment.  Subsequently, 
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the value assumptions in assessments of risk become less problematic in regulation and less 
likely to produce industry bias.  Although value assumptions are endemic to risk assessment, 
this does not necessarily compromise the objectivity of such assessments if we adopt a more 
tenable understanding of objectivity. Peer review and collaboration within the scientific 
community allow for the introduction of many different value systems during the assessment 
process which alleviates the chance of creating biased data and produces the objectivity we 
want.  While my focus is on the Canadian regulatory regime, biotechnology produces risks 
that transcend geographical and temporal boundaries.  The science is new and we are unable 
to anticipate many of its effects once transgenic organisms are released into the environment.  
There must also be consideration given to the risks associated with forgoing the benefits of 
biotechnology.  Objective risk assessments are therefore not only crucial when making 
regulatory decisions that limit our liberties, they are crucial to addressing the unique and 
irrevocable risks associated with the tremendous potential of biotechnology. 
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2. Risk and Risk Assessment 
 
     2.1 Introduction 
 
     There have been unprecedented advances in science and technology in the last few 
decades.  As our understanding of science progresses, our ability to apply this new 
knowledge has also rapidly increased, bringing new technology out of the laboratories and 
into the social sphere.  The introduction of new products and processes has enhanced our 
lives and improved health care, agriculture, education and industry.  An increased exposure to 
risks resulting from the implementation of new technology has occurred along with these 
improvements, however.  Consequently we have witnessed the emergence of risk assessment, 
a field of research that attempts to analyze, assess and manage the possible risks we face to 
our health, safety and to the environment.  Risk assessment utilizes a cross-disciplinary 
approach in characterizing and assessing risk.  Risk estimation information is then used to 
inform public policy and ultimately aid in the decisions we must make about which risks are 
worth taking.   
     Since much of the preliminary work in risk assessment involves quantification and data 
analysis, it looks very much like ordinary scientific research.  Accordingly, since it is 
commonly assumed that ordinary science is objective, risk assessment is assumed to be as 
well.  In this chapter I argue that risk assessment is value-laden.  I first give a brief overview 
of the philosophical nature of risk and make the claim that risk itself is not objective as it 
necessarily involves normative evaluation.  The nature of risk shapes the way risk is assessed 
from its characterization to its quantification.  Since the concept of risk itself is evaluative, 
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risk assessment is evaluative as well.  I then discuss objectivity in science and argue that the 
positivist view of science, as in principle value-free, is untenable.  The notion of objectivity 
as a social process arising out of peer-review and collaboration is more useful to 
understanding how we might achieve observer-independence in risk assessment.   In the third 
section of this chapter I discuss the nature of risk assessment and argue that value 
assumptions are inherent in both its quantitative and evaluative stages.    
 
  2.2 The Philosophical Nature of Risk 
 
     A risk "is the chancing of a negativity—of some loss or harm" (Rescher 5).  It is easy to 
think of risks as mere facts about the world.  We use quantifications to make sense of risky 
procedures in health care, citing one’s chances of recovery, death or complications.  Very 
rarely, however, do we think about the philosophical nature of risk or how the factual 
information used to guide decision-making is generated.  Understanding that risks incorporate 
normative evaluation both in the production of data and, even in identifying what is risky, is 
crucial to our ability to make use of risk assessment. 
     The concept of risk is a familiar one: we face risks when we cross the street, try something 
new, or choose to go left instead of right. Risks are ubiquitous in virtually every aspect of 
living and are an integral part of nearly every choice we make.  In each case we understand 
risk to be the chance that something unwanted, or possibly harmful, will arise from any given 
situation.  Risks, according to Rescher “face us with the possibility that something untoward 
may occur, while leaving us unable to foretell any specific outcome with categorical 
assurance” (5).2  We cannot choose to avoid all risks since that would be impossible and in 
many cases, risks are not foreseeable.   
                                                 
     2 Also helpful in this discussion is Baier 263-287. 
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     Rescher claims that “risk is an ontological not an epistemological category” (6-7). He uses 
this categorization to make the distinction between running a risk and taking a risk and to 
argue that one can run a risk without explicitly taking a risk (6-7).  Rescher distinguishes the 
risks we take from the risks we face.  Risks we face are those that occur through no direct 
action of our own such as hurricanes or floods, or when we are not aware of the risks 
associated with our actions.  Risks we take are those that result from an action we take, and 
which we are aware of when we make the choice to take that action. Rescher describes three 
elements of risk-taking, which must be considered when attempting to characterize risk:  
choice of action, negativity of outcome, and chance of realization (6). The first element is 
one’s choice of action, which is choosing to act in a deliberate way to either produce or avoid 
certain results.   The second element refers to the fact that taking a risk involves the possible 
occurrence of a negativity of the outcome of the choice one makes.  The third element is the 
chance that a given negativity or unwanted outcome is realized.   Rescher contends that the 
second and third elements are most crucial to risk in that one can incur a risk without having 
taken an action.    
     Since risk is the potential for the realization of unwanted or adverse consequences, “it is 
correlative with the prospect that things may go wrong—the chance of a mishap” (5).  Thus a 
situation is considered to be risky if one of its possible outcomes involves a possible loss or 
harm.  Risks involve an account of possible outcomes in light of their probabilities.  For 
example if a person is standing in the middle of a shopping mall, their risk for getting 
attacked by a shark is quite low because the probability of shopping mall shark attacks is low.  
If a person is the victim of a capsized boat in shark-infested waters, however, their risk of a 
shark attack is quite high because the probability of such an attack is high.  This situation 
would be considered quite risky.  In neither case can we guarantee the outcome—they are 
indeterminate and therefore the people in both situations are at risk to some extent.  Even if 
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an event is highly unlikely there is still some chance it may occur.  Sharks are kept in the 
West Edmonton Mall aquarium, for example, and measures taken to keep them away from 
visitors might fail.  Moreover, even if one is in a mall without an aquarium, the most that one 
is entitled to conclude from this is that the risk of shark attack is 'effectively zero', not the 
assertion that the risk of shark attack is in fact zero (Rescher 36).  Similarly, just because an 
event is very likely, does not guarantee that it will occur; people have survived for many 
hours waiting for rescue in shark-infested waters.  We must therefore rely on an account of 
the probability of an event's occurrence to determine how much of a risk it might be.  
     Despite our ability to determine the likelihood of a risk in some situations, judgements 
must still be made about many of the factors that characterize a risk.  Rescher describes three 
aspects to the nature of risk, which best demonstrate that risk always involves normative 
evaluation.  These are: 1) the characterization of negativities, 2) the incommensurability of 
negativities and 3) the lack of a common unit of currency with which to measure and 
compare negativities.  In each case, value judgements must be made in order to identify a 
situation as a risk. 
     As Rescher notes the chance of a risk being realized is only one of two components of 
risk.  The other component is the negativity of risk.  Determining the magnitude of a 
negativity is a much more complicated task than determining the chance of its occurrence 
(18).  Since risk involves both negativity and its chance or realization, risk must involve 
normative evaluation.  A high-risk situation for one person might not be considered very 
risky for another depending on the many factors taken into account when evaluating a risk.  
This causes difficulty in determining the magnitude of a risk.  Rescher divides these factors 
into three categories: character, extent and timing  (19). Determining the character of a risk 
involves identifying what type of negativity might result such as injury, death or the loss of 
time, money, or social status.  The extent of a negativity includes an account of how severe it 
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is and which or how many people might be affected by its occurrence.  It is also necessary to 
consider the timing and duration of hazards. The effects of an injury such as a broken leg can 
last for six weeks while a genetic risk can affect many generations.  Therefore, if a possible 
risk involves injury, for instance, there are many dimensions of that injury that must be 
considered such as its severity, duration, and impact on future functioning, and possible 
damage to other parts of the body.   
     Normative evaluation is also required when considering risk because of the practical 
impossibility of determining all the possible negativities an action might produce.  Risks are 
commonplace in our daily lives but we are not fully aware of them all.  We are aware that 
there is a risk of injury when we cross a busy street but we might not stop to think that we 
also put an unsuspecting motorist at risk.  Hitting someone with a car can cause injury, 
distress at the idea of hurting a pedestrian or lost wages due to an inability to cope with 
emotional turmoil.3 Of course it is not possible to evaluate every possible risk associated with 
our actions, but the fact that there are so many risks we fail to identify should serve to 
demonstrate the complexity of risks.  In any given case, the anticipated negative outcome 
may or may not occur. Engaging in an activity where risk may occur exposes a person to the 
chance that it will but does not guarantee that it will.  This is contrary to a common 
misunderstanding according to which risks can indeed be computed for a given set of 
circumstances if one utilizes the correct formula.   
     Determining the negativity of a risk also involves making normative judgements because 
there is a lack of a common unit of measure with which to express the relative comparative 
values of all the different types of risks we take. 4   Avoiding risk altogether is impossible, so 
to determine which risks are worse than others we attempt to quantify them, in order to create 
a hierarchy of risks.  Thus informed, we can choose to act so as to minimize risk while 
                                                 
     3 I assume that a motorist might find it distressing to cause injury to a person. 
     4 In this case, I use ‘value’ to mean a measurement in the assessment or evaluation of one risk against 
another. 
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maximizing benefits.  If we consider the payoff of a particular action to be of sufficient worth 
or value, we may be willing to face a higher level of risk than if the payoff was minimal.  A 
rational person might be more willing to face the risk of injury associated with running out 
into the middle of the street in midday traffic in order to pick up a one hundred dollar bill 
than they would for a one-dollar coin. 
     We must be able to measure risks in order to compare and assess them but there is a 
difficulty in attempting to quantify different negativities outside the laboratory.  Using the 
example above, the risk of injury for a one-hundred dollar bill might be considered low for an 
office worker who will lose no time at work with a cast on his leg, whereas for someone who 
makes their living as a dancer, the risks associated with an injury are much more significant.  
Certainly there are many types of risks and Rescher asks, “At what rate of exchange for 
example, is one to trade discomfort, boredom, pain, and monetary loss off against one 
another?  For example, is prolonged near-term boredom something inherently greater than 
brief physical pain in the more distant future?” (20). We must therefore rely on normative 
evaluation to determine which risks are worse than others and which risks are worth taking or 
facing.   
     Understanding the nature of risk is essential to making potentially life-altering decisions.  
Whether or not a person engages in a high-risk activity depends on their evaluation of the 
possible harm or benefit they might experience.  This sort of value judgement is easy to 
identify.  On the other hand, the normative evaluation that risk involves is not so readily 
acknowledged.  When a situation is considered to be a risk, it is easy to mistake this as a 
simple characterization of harm.  Risks are often expressed as probabilities, which makes it 
difficult to recognize that normative assumptions are as much a part of risk as are statistics.     
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2.3  Objectivity in Science 
 
     Rather than assuming risks are factual matters in the world, I argue that understanding the 
philosophical nature of risk, and recognizing that risk always involves normative evaluation, 
enhance our ability to make use of risk assessment as a tool to guide our use of new 
technology.  It is necessary to consider the notion of objectivity in science in order to 
understand the role it plays in our reliance on risk data to make decisions.  Value assumptions 
are inherent to risk, and so I argue that objectivity in risk assessment cannot arise from the 
positivist view of observer-independent science.  Instead, if we understand objectivity as a 
social construct, we can accommodate the normative nature of risk while preserving genuine 
objectivity.  As I shall argue, however, this enriched understanding of the real nature of 
scientific objectivity dictates a variety of changes in the Canadian regulatory regime 
regarding the implementation of biotechnology.   
     Given the incommensurability of qualitative risk comparisons, the attempt to assess risk 
must involve evaluative appraisals of what will be considered harmful and what will not.  The 
mere quantification of risk is inadequate to establish the claim that risk can be objectively 
determined since the collection and production of risk data involves making decisions that are 
guided by values.  Since characterizations of risks can vary so broadly, any comparison of 
them involves evaluation, which necessarily introduces the value-perspective of the assessor.  
The occurrence of an event, such as a hurricane, is not inherently negative.  A hurricane in 
the middle of the ocean poses no direct hazard to people (though it might pose a hazard to 
things that people value such as wildlife), and therefore does not constitute a risk, unless 
there is a non-zero probability that the hurricane may approach a populated region.  If there is 
a non-zero probability, the hurricane does pose a risk even if it never reaches that region.  
Rescher argues that we  
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ascribe values to negativities—it is (in large measure) a matter of human decision to 
assess negativities vis-à-vis one another.  The sizes or magnitudes of negativities are 
not pre-existing quantities—they are the derivative result of an evaluative judgment or 
decision…And so here, man can supply what nature itself leaves untouched.  He can 
introduce a measurement-comparison by taking an evaluative stance, by deciding 
upon certain essentially normative commitments (27). 
 
Thus, it is difficult to defend the claim that risk assessment is objective when what we 
consider a risk is not only context-dependent—as in the case of the hurricane—but is 
dependent on the values we attribute to certain events and their outcomes.  We cannot say 
that a certain outcome is inherently risky without placing it into an evaluative framework in 
which to understand its riskiness.  The factual and normative components are therefore 
inextricable: they cannot be considered separately and still be useful in the assessment of risk. 
     Determining the probability of an outcome provides the facts that inform the appraisal and 
comparison of negativities.  Rescher contends that even the often-cited objectivity of 
measuring is questionable since it involves the comparison of risks, which is an evaluative 
action.  Factual and evaluative information are both vital for understanding and 
characterizing any type of risk.  Decisions made using the data collected by risk analysis 
introduce elements of the subjective.  Rescher suggests, “Questions of causality are of course 
indisputably factual and scientific issues.  But this does not make them unproblematic and 
uncontroversial” (31).  I argue, however, that even the production of seemingly objective data 
within scientific risk analysis is subject to value assumptions.   
     In science ‘objectivity’ typically means that any individual following the same procedure 
should reach the same conclusion (Fischoff, Watson and Hope 31).  Therefore, if objectivity 
is to be achieved, any expectations, preconceived notions or personal desires of those 
performing an experiment or conducting research should have no influence on the outcome of 
such endeavours.  This observer-independence is crucial to the notion of objective science 
since the advancement of scientific knowledge relies on the repeatability of results.  If an 
experiment conducted by many individuals produces disparate results, no definite 
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conclusions can be drawn before the error is identified.  The goal of science is to understand 
how the world works and to discover the laws governing the behaviour of the world.  
Therefore, in the quest for scientific truth, we either attempt to understand the law behind an 
event repeated over and over or we attempt to manipulate something in the world to produce 
a result that repeats itself and try to understand what causes this to happen.  In this pursuit, it 
is necessary that an observers’ own desires or wishes do not interfere with the results of their 
investigations. Given the nature of the process of science, however, this is difficult to 
achieve. 
     Whether or not, and the extent to which, the pursuit of scientific knowledge is objective is 
not a question I will attempt to address in this thesis.  The analysis of how objectivity is 
achieved in science, however, does have relevance to the discussion of risk assessment, since 
risk assessment is in part a scientific process.  This brief discussion of objectivity in science 
demonstrates that there has been much debate over the prevalence of value assumptions in 
science.  Where and when these assumptions occur is not of primary importance for this 
discussion.  What is relevant is the acknowledgement that the traditional perception of 
science as intrinsically objective is not a tenable notion.  Rather than using the positivist idea 
of objectivity to mean completely observer-independent, what is needed is an enriched notion 
of objectivity which reflects the fact that value assumptions are made when conducting 
scientific research but do not necessarily undermine the genuine objectivity reached by the 
scientific community. 5     
     In the first half of the twentieth century, positivists articulated the notion of objectivity as 
the pursuit of truth through science.  Stemming from this, the positivist notion of science 
holds that science is in principle wholly value-free and that there is a definite distinction 
between facts and values in any scientific undertaking.  For a positivist, there can be no value 
                                                 
     5 I will use ‘objectivity’ to refer to the positivist ideal of observer-independence and value-free throughout 
this paper. 
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assumptions in good science because objective investigation is the only kind of investigation 
that can produce the facts we use to inform us about how the world works.  There is now, 
however, a general consensus that values must in fact play a role in science.  Putnam 
contends that even the physical sciences, sometimes considered to be the most objective of 
the disciplines in terms of observer-independence, are nonetheless value-laden because 
human interests influence both what the questions in science are, and how to go about 
investigating them (Putnam 1998). Current discussion no longer centres on establishing this 
fact but, rather, focuses on how science progresses despite its value-ladenness, that is, how a 
value-laden enterprise can be objective.  It is widely understood that values do play a role in 
the understanding of observational or experimental data. This is of great significance to any 
regime of regulation that appeals to objectivity as the arbiter of legitimacy in quantitative 
analysis, which is what currently occurs with biotechnology. 
   Objectivity, and the use of factual information rather than subjective or evaluative 
information, has largely been viewed as the primary reason for our reliance on science to 
enhance our understanding of the world.  Logical positivists contended that science should be 
value-free and that there is a marked distinction between fact and value.  Facts are 
characterized as being quantitative, objective information about the world around us obtained 
through experimentation or observation.  What makes something a fact is that it exists 
whether or not we believe it, or whether we are able to articulate it or not.  Facts are things 
like the speed of light, mass of an electron or the boiling point of water at sea level that, 
ostensibly, can be observed by anyone using the proper methodology.  In the case of risk 
assessment, factual information is that information produced through scientific method in 
answer to questions of causality and to determine probabilities.   
     If what I have claimed about the philosophical nature of risk is true, then the evaluative 
side of risk assessment, however, also involves answering normative questions regarding the 
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seriousness or significance of a particular risk.  The evaluation of any endeavour relies on 
ascribing values to the outcome.  Values, then, function to guide us in our evaluation of the 
world around us, and in the questions we ask.  Even if there were any such thing as bare facts 
by themselves they would be useless unless situated in some evaluative context.  The 
positivist distinction between fact and value is accompanied by much debate, which I will not 
go into further.  Even if, for the sake of argument, we can make a distinction between facts 
and values in science, we cannot ignore the role values play in risk assessment.  It is not 
possible to do science without purposes and those purposes are a part of our evaluation.  
Neglecting to acknowledge the close relationship between facts and values in risk assessment 
is to assume that the questions we use it to answer are arrived at through some purely 
objective method.  These motivations are value-driven and subjective, and therefore, are 
intertwined with the objective, factual information of science.     
     Kuhn for instance, suggests that subjective elements are in fact an ineliminable part of the 
nature of scientific knowledge.  Explanations of what the data obtained through 
experimentation actually mean require evaluation, which introduces subjective 
categorizations into how scientists understand the world.  Choosing which data are worth 
collecting and how they are to be interpreted is largely influenced by the expectations and 
past training a scientist has.  Kuhn further asserts that in the decision-making process, the 
criterion of choice a scientist uses functions as a value.  This again tells us that values 
function to guide us.  For Kuhn, values “specify a great deal:  what each scientist must 
consider in reaching a conclusion, what he may or may not consider relevant, and what he 
can legitimately be required to repeat as the basis for the choice he has made” (362).      
    While Kuhn’s account of the role of values in science is often criticized for potentially 
giving rise to relativism, Longino has offered a related account that does not lead to 
relativism. Longino provides an account of objectivity that has particular importance for the 
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case of risk assessment in biotechnology.  Where Rescher argues that questions of causality 
are indisputably factual, it seems that this is only the case in the most basic data produced 
(31). For example, though counting the number of people injured by a plane crash is surely an 
objective task, its outcome depends on how we choose to define injury.  Do we include 
people who lost a limb along with those who stubbed a toe, merely bruised an elbow, were 
traumatized, lost a contract, or were made late for their wedding?  Assuming that the data we 
use to analyze a risk is objective also assumes that the methodology with which the data was 
acquired is objective as well, and this is not always the case. 
     The positivist idea that science is an objective pursuit because it relies on quantitative data 
and reveals the truth in nature is difficult to defend given the evaluative considerations behind 
the very questions asked in science.  This does not mean that objectivity is completely elusive 
or impossible. Longino contends that “criticism from alternative points of view is required for 
objectivity and that the subjection of hypotheses and evidential reasoning to critical scrutiny 
is what limits the intrusion of individual subjective preference into scientific knowledge” 
(181).  She also argues that science occurs within a community and scientific knowledge is 
produced through a concerted effort within the community.  New theories are premised on 
established ones and the process of peer review subjects advances to scrutiny and criticism 
from a variety of sources.  This process creates a sort of self-regulating atmosphere for the 
progress of scientific knowledge and thereby transcends individual contributions.  Scientific 
knowledge is ultimately a product of the community, arising through a series of verifications 
and reviews, even if the original idea is from one individual. 6  Therefore, Longino asserts, 
scientific knowledge is a kind of social knowledge and the objectivity that results from 
scientific practice is dependent on the degree to which it withstands criticism from the 
scientific community as a whole.  The greater the number of perspectives used in critically 
                                                 
     6 Of course, not every perspective is going to count such as the opinions of the intellectually immature.  
 18
analyzing scientific knowledge, the more likely that knowledge will be objective (in the non-
positivist sense) and closer to a description of what occurs in nature rather than a reflection of 
the background assumptions inherent in its generation (Longino 185).  Thus the incorporation 
of either an individual scientist’s or the community’s values into a theory or paradigm does 
not necessarily indicate an absence of objectivity.  Instead, “such analysis should be taken as 
showing the way in which such contextual features have facilitated the use of given data or 
observations as evidence for some hypothesis by an individual or a community” (Longino 
187).   
     The positivist view of objectivity in science can thus be replaced by a concept of 
objectivity as a social construct.  Science does not advance without discussion and the 
sharing of information; it is a social activity.  Longino’s claim that scientific knowledge is 
social knowledge has significant implications in the assessment of risk since much of the 
current policy is predicated on the assumption that risk data is produced objectively in the 
positivist sense of the term. 
     After considering the difficulty in establishing objectivity in science, and given the 
complexity of the nature of risk, it is difficult to argue that any stage of risk assessment can 
occur in the absence of value judgements.  Recognizing the role of evaluation in 
understanding risk serves to provide a more useful and workable method in assessing risks.       
I have argued that the assessments of values are incommensurable and that risks always 
involve values.  This does not mean that we are completely unable to compare risks against 
one another.  Rescher contends that risks “do indeed become comparable, extrinsically 
comparable, once we bring upon the scene an evaluator with an axiological value-perspective 
of his own…the value scheme of an evaluator can commeasure the otherwise 
incommensurable” (26).  Longino's account of objectivity can be seen as expanding on 
Rescher's point.  Since the production of objective scientific knowledge is fundamentally a 
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social process, an objective account of risk requires that the role of evaluator be distributed 
among many participants. This highlights the critical role that value assumptions come to 
play in understanding how to assess negativities.  Combined with an enriched understanding 
of how we can arrive at an objective assessment through social collaboration, it is apparent 
that the evaluative framework in which risk assessment is conducted can become an asset.  It 
is important, therefore, to acknowledge that our values do indeed play a role throughout the 
production of scientific data.  Once this is recognized, we can make sure that the values 
informing our decisions about which risks we will quantify and ultimately take are the ones 
we want to play such a vital role. 
 
2.4  Defining risk assessment 
 
     Having argued that objectivity is produced through peer-review and collaboration, and 
that risk involves making value assumptions, I define and discuss risk assessment and the 
processes it involves when used as a method of evaluation.  I argue that all the components of 
risk assessment are value-laden despite its reliance on statistical information and probability 
calculations.   
     The evaluative nature of risk demands evaluation throughout the process of risk 
assessment as well.  If judgements must be made to understand or identify a risk, then 
judgements must also be made to assess a risk.  Scientists express risk as a probability.  For 
example, when testing the effect of a reagent, risk to cellular functioning is calculated by 
simply counting the number of cells at the beginning of the experiment, and comparing this 
number with how many are left after exposure to the chemical and averaging these 
observations over several trials.  The general case is much more complex than this scenario 
suggests, however.  There is no account of the other types of risks that the cells may be 
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exposed to other than cell death.  For example, the reagent might also have harmed the cell, 
its ability to function or had a mutagenic effect that may not manifest for many generations.  
Moreover, a scientific case like this is much simpler than any case of risk outside the lab. The 
risks people face in their daily lives are much more difficult to measure.  How does one 
quantify the risk of losing their job or breaking a leg?  And how would we go about placing a 
numerical value on the risk of losing out on a potentially beneficial opportunity when we 
choose one course of action over another?   
     Since negativities are incommensurable, Rescher suggests that any assessment of risk 
results in comparisons that are non-standard and perhaps even unacceptable at times.  Mere 
quantification of risk, that is, a statistical assessment of the probability of the occurrence of 
negativities, is insufficient for making decisions in risky situations.  Many other factors must 
be included to provide a context for understanding risk.  The introduction of non-qualitative 
factors and the necessity of providing a context in which to make a comparison of risk, 
introduce subjective elements into seemingly objective circumstances. 
     The risks that we can anticipate allow us to choose whether or not they are worth taking 
and it is this that gives us some control over what sort of life we lead.  In the decision-making 
process, we are forced to compare one risk against another, which is a difficult task since a 
risk could be one of many different types of things such as injury, loss of time, or illness. The 
science of quantitative risk assessment attempts to characterize the probability of a negative 
outcome through statistical analysis but given the incommensurability of negativities or 
adverse outcomes, it is difficult to determine to what extent such information should be relied 
upon when making decisions or creating public policy. 7    
     It is necessary to make a distinction between individual risks and societal risks as 
suggested by Shrader-Frechette (19).  Individual risks are those that we freely choose to take, 
                                                 
     7 For my purposes, quantitative risk analysis refers to the statistical characterization of negative outcomes on 
a case-by-case basis.  Therefore, the data produced by risk analysis can quantify a number of different types of 
risks ranging from injury or morbidity, to costs incurred and labour hours lost. 
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basing our decisions on our respective circumstances and systems of values (19).  Societal 
risks, on the other hand, are those risks that are involuntarily imposed on us and which are 
seldom affected by our individual values (19-20).  The government or policy makers assess 
societal risks and decide which risks we will face as a collective since not everyone can 
feasibly have a say or express their opinions about this.  Therefore, not only is it essential that 
societal risks be assessed accurately, but also since these decisions are much more complex 
than those an individual makes, there must be some standard procedure through which 
decisions can be made (Shrader-Frechette 34).8    This standard procedure is risk assessment. 
     Risk assessment is the evaluation or analysis of the inherent riskiness of a process, 
product, technology or action and is used to inform the management of risks.  Shrader-
Frechette identifies three main components to risk assessment:  risk identification, risk 
estimation and risk evaluation. 9  She explains that to identify a risk, a variety of scientific 
methods are employed such as epidemiological or toxicological studies.  Identification relies 
on statistical analysis.  Risk estimation is the determination of the magnitude of a risk and 
involves both an examination of, for example, the dose-response relationship and the 
characterization of the population at risk and an estimation of the dose of a particular 
substance it receives.  Risk evaluation is conducted after the first two steps have been 
followed and determines the acceptability of a certain risk (Shrader-Frechette 15-29).   
     The first two components of risk assessment that Shrader-Frechette outlines are often used 
in a common mathematical definition of risk as described by Rasmussen (196):   
Risk (consequence/time) = Frequency (event/time) x Magnitude (consequence/event) 
Rasmussen (196) demonstrates that this equation can be used to calculate a variety of risks 
such as the risk of death in automobile accidents in the United States:   
(15x106 accidents/year)(1 death/ 300 accidents) = 50,000 deaths/year 
                                                 
     8 See also Cutter 37-39. 
     9 Although the methodology or risk assessment varies from country to country, the general view given here is 
that most often employed. 
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Quantitative characterization of risk, like the example above, is carried out in a number of 
different ways using a variety of methodologies.  Such an approach, however, is limited when 
attempting to apply it to new technologies, such as biotechnology, since frequency data are 
often unavailable.  Additionally, the inclusion of a temporal component in a calculation like 
this one makes a comparison between risk assessment data possible.  It does not, however, 
provide a full account of the temporal occurrence of negativities.  As Rescher explains, a 
major disaster  
that kills 1,000 people at a blow is one thing, a chronic hazard that kills the same 
number over the course of a whole generation is something else, and a dangerous 
bequest to future generations (unsafely stored nuclear waste, for example, or synthetic 
genes) is still different in its timing (19). 
 
The calculation of risk using an equation is useful when trying to characterize determinate 
risks such as car accidents.  Such a method cannot adequately address risks involving 
uncertainty like those associated with biotechnology.    
     Biotechnology, perhaps even more than some other risky technologies, is characterized by 
pervasive uncertainty.  There is an element of chance in all situations involving risk and, 
therefore, risks are typically expressed as probabilities.  In cases involving uncertainty, 
however, it is much more difficult to predict the probabilities of various hazards.  
“Uncertainty is the indetermination, through ignorance or otherwise, of some of the 
characterizing elements of a risk situation” (Rescher 94).  There are no decisively good 
reasons for risk assessors to believe that they have identified the right potential hazards of 
rDNA technologies.  Neither scientists nor regulators are certain that the risks most often 
associated with biotechnology are in fact the risks that should be watched for.  This is in 
contrast to the hazards associated with driving a car.  Highway engineers can forecast 
fatalities with considerable accuracy every year even though they do not know how many 
fatalities will occur.  Biotechnological risks are assessed under uncertainty, which requires 
experts to offer subjective probabilities (i.e., educated guesses) about these hazards.       
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     There are many methods that can be used in evaluating a risk.  According to Shrader-
Frechette, the most prominent methods of risk evaluation are risk-cost benefit analysis 
(RCBA) and evaluating acceptable risk.10 RCBA is the procedure that allows risk assessment 
to address the complexity of societal decision-making by taking into account different 
viewpoints, allowing for discussion and providing a well-established basis for argument or 
agreement (Shrader-Frechette 34).  Through a series of steps, RCBA defines the risk 
problem, describes the relationships among the various courses of actions and their 
consequences, assigns a common unit to the risk decisions (typically the common unit is 
money) and then calculates a single numerical value to each of the alternatives which is 
representative of the difference between the benefits and the risks and costs (Shrader-
Frechette 30).   
     This particular configuration of risk assessment is a prominent one despite some of the 
limitations and problems it has, which I do not intend to discuss further.  Once the risk for a 
given technology or product has been assessed in the way described, the results are used to 
make decisions on how to manage such risks in society and the environment which ultimately 
have far-reaching and widespread effects.  Risk assessment, then, plays a crucial role in 
determining which risks society must face.  Value judgements are endemic not only to the 
evaluation component of risk assessment but also to the identification and estimation of risk 
since the very question of what we consider to be a risk is based on subjective decision-
making.   
     A final consideration is the perception we have of risk and the usefulness of risk 
assessment.11  Since risk assessments are science-based, they are not easily or widely 
accessible to the general public.  Risk assessment is not normally conducted in the public 
                                                 
     10 Although both of these methods are common, I will focus only on RCBA since this is the more prominent 
of the two approaches and is used in the Canadian regulatory system for biotechnology. 
     11 Perceived risk is an area of greater depth than I wish to go into here.  I include only a brief mention of it 
because I feel it does play a role in the development of the policy for biotechnology regulation, however, it is 
not one of the areas I plan to focus on in this paper. 
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realm so questions about which risks are worth measuring are not routinely open to public 
discussion.  Additionally, involvement in decisions about risks usually occurs only after a 
controversy has begun.  As a result, when policy makers or scientists appeal to risk 
assessments when informing the public about the risks involved in some new development or 
product, it creates the impression that there were no other risks worth measuring or reporting.  
Risk assessors are looked upon as authorities and this is problematic since it is often unclear 
who is deciding which risks are significant enough to study, and what the underlying 
motivation for disregarding the other risks might be.  Even when regulatory bodies make 
these decisions, risk assessors are required to make a number of decisions involving 
normative issues.  The inability to accurately assign a standard currency for risks, as Rescher 
suggests, makes determining their probability challenging.  It would be remiss to undertake 
the assessment of any type of risk without first understanding the nature of risk itself.  The 
calculus of risk does not merely involve the probability of some unwanted occurrence.     
 
2.5  Problems with value-laden risk assessment 
 
     In this discussion I have argued that risk involves evaluation and therefore incorporates 
value assumptions.  Additionally I have shown that normative claims are endemic to risk 
assessment.  Despite the tendency to emphasize objectivity in science, value-ladenness does 
not compromise the usefulness of attempting to characterize and quantify risk.  If we 
recognize that science is not intrinsically objective but objective results can be produced 
through social discourse and examination, then we can apply this notion to the process of risk 
assessment.  Thus, we can rely on risk assessment to help inform our decision-making. 
     I have claimed that the assessment of risk includes both a factual and a normative side.  It 
is necessary to consider both sides together in any characterization of risk. Rescher suggests 
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that the factual side is an indisputably scientific issue, although certainly not unproblematic, I 
further argue that even the data upon which normative issues rely are in fact not objective.  
As Longino maintains, the social account of scientific knowledge and objectivity call into 
question the positivist view.  Additionally, it is important to realize that value assumptions 
play a role in risk assessment whether they are identified or not.  Shrader-Frechette argues 
that risk assessors: 
often forget the methodological assumptions, which limit the validity of their risk-
evaluation conclusions.  In other words, the real difficulty is not that each of the three 
stages of risk assessment…involves methodological assumptions but that, in practice, 
these assumptions are often ignored.  As a consequence, risk assessment results are 
often viewed as far more objective than they really are.  This, in turn, means that 
policy conclusions based on the assessment results are frequently more controversial 
and value-laden than is thought (48). 
 
     There are then two key points concerning objectivity in risk assessment.  The first is that, 
as Shrader-Frechette points out, the value assumptions that are made throughout the process 
of risk assessment are usually not recognized.  This is a detriment to the usefulness of risk 
assessment in that decisions are made based on incomplete information.  It is important to 
understand why certain risks are considered worth measuring or comparing and why some 
are dismissed.  The second concerns the need for an enriched view of objectivity.  The notion 
of science as an intrinsically objective endeavour is hard to maintain, if objective means 
value-free, since it does not recognize the value assumptions that scientists must make.  If on 
the other hand objectivity in science can be achieved by social discourse, then this insight 
should be brought to bear on the process of risk assessment.  The failure to recognize that 
both risk assessment and science in general are value-laden hinders our ability to utilize the 
information they provide us because it is impossible to tell how the information they produce 
was arrived at.   
     In the Canadian regulatory regime, risk data for genetically modified organisms are 
produced by the company, which manufactures them, and are not held up within the scientific 
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community for widespread debate or examination.12 In fact regulatory risk assessment of all 
sorts of technologies in many countries such as the United States, Australia and the United 
Kingdom, have this same general framework. This is due to the persistence of the view that 
quantitative analysis is objective and the data it produces are free from value assumptions.  
The assessors themselves are often responsible for the perpetuation of this untenable view of 
risk assessment and thus there is insufficient acknowledgement of any normative component 
within the analysis of risk. 
     Ideally, any assignment of the probability of an unwanted outcome should face critical 
evaluation on a number of perspectives in order to ensure its objectivity and the underlying 
values of risk assessors ought to be made evident.  Our reliance on and perception of factual 
information as inherently objective presently precludes such an approach. Therefore, the 
assumptions made by scientists based on contextual and individual values incorporated into 
risk data go unchecked and subsequently, indirectly inform the normative evaluation of risk.  
     The salient feature of this discussion of objectivity is complexity.  Actual risks by their 
very nature involve a great many variables, only some of which can be easily identified.  
Moreover, establishing the role of objectivity in science is much more complex than 
traditional views of science may imply.  Furthermore, not only must the subjective nature of 
risk be taken into account, but also the difficulty in anticipating the risks of a new technology, 
such as biotechnology, with which there has been little experience.  The tendency to rely on 
science when faced with advances in technology and its associated risks is not cause for 
concern because science is a good way to keep informed.  What is problematic, however, is 
assuming that the information used to make decisions about implementing the products of 
new technology is value-free.  Value-laden information is certainly not useless and it need 
not be discarded.  It is the only source of information available, but it is important to 
                                                 
     12 I will discuss the Canadian regulatory process in more depth in the next chapter. 
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acknowledge that it can be influenced by the desires or attitudes of those who produce or 
manufacture it.   
     Knowing the source of information is a part of understanding what that information 
reveals and how it is to be interpreted.  Risk assessment then, ought to begin when deciding 
which questions are worth answering, or in need of answering, and continue right up to the 
interpretation of the analysis produced.  The government or regulatory body ought to make 
explicit the value assumptions that guide regulation which would not only enhance the 
usefulness of risk data, but would also make the regulatory process much more transparent 
than it is currently.  A transparent system of regulation makes information about the risks 
associated with transgenic science accessible to a much broader range of people who must 
ultimately face the risks of biotechnology, and since it would be generated from a given set of 
value assumptions, it would be more accessible to those who do not have the scientific 
background to make sense of risk analyses.  Transparency is essential because not everyone 
has the ability to interpret sets of morbidity data or contamination levels.  It is much easier for 
someone without scientific training to understand risks when they are described as damages 
to native insect or bird populations.  Since a transparent system makes value assumptions 
much easier to identify, scientists, citizens and proponents can ensure that the ‘right’ 
assumptions are influencing risk assessments.  The ‘right’ assumptions are those that are 
justifiable in some context of societal discourse.  They demand a certain level of expertise to 
avoid the bias of irrational beliefs an ordinary citizen may have, such as the danger of 
microwaves, but are subject to revision by interested parties.            
     The discussion of risk assessment and objectivity so far can be of particular use in the 
field of biotechnology.  The use of rDNA technology to manipulate organisms at the genetic 
level has the ability to produce myriad new products and processes, which will be 
incorporated both into our daily lives but also into our surrounding environment.  The risks 
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associated with the development of biotechnology are societal rather than merely individual 
risks.  Biotechnology and its applications affect a much greater percentage of the population 
than other advances in the last few decades.  Nuclear reactors are often contained or isolated 
from surrounding populations, although they can certainly affect a great many people when 
something goes wrong.  In the case of genomic science, manipulation of the genetic code in a 
living organism can be passed down from generation to generation.  With gene flow, these 
changes can become widespread and can cause hybridization with other species.  Any 
alteration in the genetic code produces proliferating change once such organisms are released 
into the environment, and containment is tremendously difficult outside the laboratory.  The 
far-reaching effects of biotechnology demand an account of the values driving not only the 
science and the industry, but also the regulatory bodies that decide which risks will be faced 
by all members of society.  
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3.  Biotechnology  
 
 
     3.1 Introduction 
 
     In Canada, and most other countries, attempting to address the widespread use of 
biotechnology, great emphasis is placed on the valuable information risk assessment provides 
concerning transgenic organisms.  As rDNA technology has had such a short history, little is 
known about the effects its products have both on humans and the environment.  Regulatory 
bodies and scientists rely on risk assessments to address the potential safety concerns such 
effects may produce.  Since risk assessment is value-laden the failure to recognize this aspect 
of risk assessment is problematic. 
     I will give a brief overview and background of biotechnology and the concurrent genesis 
of the biotech industry, which has played a significant role in the pace of developments in 
rDNA technology as well as the rapid development and incorporation of its applications.  
This co-evolution necessitates accurate and objective risk assessment since many of the 
ethical and policy concerns arising from biotechnology have been addressed based on risk 
data that is presumed to be value-free.  The influence of values endemic to risk assessment on 
the production of this data has gone unrecognized.  Since industry serves as a driving force in 
the field of genomics, public policy has lagged behind the science. Therefore, policy makers 
rely heavily on the risk data produced by the industry with little acknowledgement that the 
inherent value assumptions made in the production of this data may not coincide with the 
existing ethical framework created to help guide the development of this technology.   
     In this chapter an outline is given of some major risks associated with biotechnology in 
order to identify why transgenic science provides a unique set of challenges to regulation.  I 
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also discuss the regulation of transgenic organisms in Canada and explain the role risk 
assessment has in the creation of public policy concerning these organisms.  The Canadian 
government has created a collaborative body (the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Council 
or CBAC), which has attempted to provide an ethical framework for biotechnology.  The 
current system is set up in such a way, however, that the value assumptions inherent to risk 
assessment go unrecognized which results in both an incomplete account of the risks in 
biotechnology, and the incorporation of these values into the ethical framework upon which 
regulation is based.  This is of particular concern since regulation involves placing constraints 
on the freedoms of individuals and corporations. Therefore, it is important that the basis for 
deciding which limitations will be placed on society be made as unbiased as possible by 
incorporating the values of more than a few select groups. 
 
3.2 Background  
 
     In order to understand the role of risk assessment in biotechnology, it is useful to first 
briefly examine the basis of genomic science.13  The rapidity of development in our 
understanding of genes and their interactions within the cell belies the complexity of the 
science behind their discovery. The unprecedented pace of the advancement of genomic 
science has resulted in an incomplete understanding of its inherent risks.    
     Every plant and animal cell contains a nucleus with deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that 
carries the entire genetic code for the organism it belongs to.  DNA is made up of alternating 
sequences of four amino acids: guanine, cytosine, adenine and tyrosine.  These nucleic acids 
bond very specifically to each other forming what are called base pairs.  Adenine bonds only 
with tyrosine and guanine bonds only with cytosine.  Long chains of these base pairs make up 
                                                 
     13 For a more in depth description see Klug and Cummings 219-231. 
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the two strands of DNA (one strand in single celled organisms) and due to their unique 
bonding pattern, create a double helix, which is the very identifiable structure of DNA.   
     DNA carries what is often referred to as the ‘blueprint’ for the structure and function of an 
organism since, during the development of plants and animals, it is the DNA that dictates the 
expression of all the traits that it possesses.  Sequences of DNA coding for a single 
polypeptide (a molecule made up of amino acids) are called genes, and can occur alone or in 
groups. Genes can act either alone or in concert with other genes to code for such things as 
eye colour, height, disease resistance and body shape.  The action of one gene can be isolated 
and expressed phenotypically, or it can have an effect on the functioning of other genes.14  
Once scientists understood this, it was thought that genes could be removed from one 
organism with a desirable trait, such as antibiotic resistance, and be placed into another 
organism without this trait.  The discovery of restriction enzymes, which cut the DNA strand 
at sequence-specific sites, was the key to realizing this advancement.  Restriction enzymes 
allow a scientist to target a desirable gene from one organism, remove it from its host, and 
attach it to the DNA strand of another organism thus conferring whatever trait the transferred 
gene codes for.  Genetic manipulation of this sort is the basis of what we know today as 
biotechnology.   
 
 3.3 Biotechnology and the emergence of the Biotech Industry  
 
     Once scientists had a basic understanding of how DNA and restriction enzymes 
functioned, the potential of its applications were quickly recognized and the field of 
biotechnology emerged.  The development of this new area of science over the last thirty 
years has been intertwined with the evolution of the biotech industry.  The close relationship 
                                                 
     14 Phenotypic expression is the physical manifestation of the trait a gene or group of genes code for.  Thus, 
having brown eyes or straight hair is the phenotypic expression of the respective gene coding for brown eyes or 
straight hair. 
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between technology and industry also produced an increased reliance on risk assessment to 
guide development and understand safety concerns.  There has been very little time to learn 
about how transgenic organisms interact within the laboratory let alone in the environment.  
Thus, risk assessment has become the arbiter of development in biotechnology.  The co-
evolution of biotechnology and industry has contributed to the crucial role risk assessment 
plays in regulation. 
     Biotechnology is a rapidly developing science with widespread and far-reaching 
implications for many areas of society such as agriculture, medicine, pharmacy and 
industry.15  It is defined as any manipulation of a biological system through technology 
(Yount 3).  In modern biotechnology, this manipulation occurs through the techniques of 
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) technology—that is, the insertion and 
incorporation of a segment of DNA from one organism (plant, animal or micro organism) 
into the DNA of another organism.  This is possible because most cells in a living organism 
contain DNA, which codes for its particular development. 16  The structure and function of 
genes are the same regardless of the type of organism in which they are found.17 Due to the 
relatively simple composition of DNA, it is possible, for example, to take segments of 
bacterial DNA and insert them into the DNA of a plant or animal since the four nucleic acids 
bond to each other in a specific manner that is not dependent on the type of organism from 
which it originates.  The altered cell becomes capable of producing whichever protein the 
transferred gene codes for regardless of whether it ever produced it before.   
    The result of this genetic manipulation is a new or rare product or organism.  For example 
bacteria or any type of animal can be made to produce human hormones with the insertion of 
the corresponding human gene into their cells.  Antibiotic resistance in one strain of bacteria 
can be conferred to a non-resistant strain using the same methodology.  Other applications of 
                                                 
     15 For further discussion about the uses and effects of biotechnology, see Anderson 9-42. 
     16 Not all cells contain DNA such as non-nucleated cells (red blood cells). 
     17 A gene is a section of base pairs that confers a particular trait or characteristic to the organism. 
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rDNA technology include the production of industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, livestock 
and new or improved foods.  Additionally it can produce advances in forensic science, virus-
resistant crops, diagnostic tests for genetic diseases and in fact, new studies suggest there is a 
promising future in gene therapy for diseases such as ADA (adenosine deaminase) deficiency 
(Barnum 1). Biotechnology provides the ability to move genes or groups of genes at will, and 
to decipher and demystify the genetic codes that dictate the structure and development of 
organisms.  It also allows the development of organisms for specific uses and to make or 
modify products, plants or animals.  Transgenic science and its applications were recognized 
to have enormous potential to improve the quality of life as well as unprecedented 
commercial rewards for those who could exploit this potential.  Thus the evolution of 
scientific knowledge in biotechnology has occurred hand in hand with the development of the 
industry it created. 
     Biotechnology has a long history in domestication and agriculture through selective 
breeding, winemaking and other familiar processes.  Modern rDNA biotechnology, however, 
had its start just over thirty years ago and has progressed rapidly since then.  The first major 
breakthrough, which contributed to the genesis of rDNA technology, occurred when Watson 
and Crick discovered the structure of DNA in 1953. 18  This information combined with 
concurrent developments in the understanding of cellular structure and functioning provided 
the basis upon which rDNA technology was discovered.  By the early 1970s, scientists had 
discovered how to exchange genes between organisms instead of merely deciphering them.  It 
was at this point that progress in transgenic science began to accelerate and the subsequent 
development of commercial applications and the industry of biotechnology followed closely 
behind.     
                                                 
     18 The discovery of DNA is most often attributed to Watson and Crick but they shared the Nobel Prize in 
chemistry with Wilkes and Franklin, whose work was critical to the discovery. 
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     Despite the relative newness of this science, the immense potential of its products and 
applications did not go unnoticed.  By 1976 the commercial potential of gene manipulation 
was recognized and inspired the beginning of biotechnology as an industry.  Robert Swanson 
and Herb Boyer founded Genentech in the hope of capitalizing on this new technology in 
what has become the first of numerous biotech companies (Old and Primrose 4).  By 1978 the 
scientists at Genentech had cloned human insulin, and, in 1982, this became the first rDNA 
pharmaceutical product to be marketed (Old and Primrose 4). Eight years later, Genentech 
merged with the pharmaceutical company Roche in exchange for an estimated $2.1 billion.  
The tremendous financial potential of biotechnology for corporations has had a major impact 
on the pace of progress in genomic science. 
     The development of the science of genetic manipulation has been progressing at an 
unprecedented pace over the last three decades.  At the same time, an enormous and even 
faster-paced industry has emerged based on this science thus creating a biotechnology-
industry complex.  Since the creation of Genentech, hundreds of biotech companies have 
been formed, although many have been short-lived.  Today large companies such as 
Monsanto, Novartis and AgrEvo dominate the industry and are responsible for the production 
of many marketable transgenic products.  Consequently, much of the new research is 
concentrated in commercial applications as these companies compete with each other.  With 
the increased pressure from industry attempting to capitalize on the transgenic organisms they 
produce, policy makers are under pressure to make safety assessments as quickly and as 
accurately as possible to keep up with corporate-funded science.  
     Risk assessment has become an instrumental component of biotechnology regulation since 
scientists do not have the benefit of years of experience handling and observing these 
organisms in the laboratory.  Bauer and Gaskell argue that biotechnology is “the third 
strategic technology of the period since the Second World War, following nuclear power and 
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information technology” (379). In the case of nuclear technology, however, commercial 
applications were few and regulation was understandably strict enough to quell the 
emergence of independent companies using nuclear power.  The profit potential of applying 
nuclear technology commercially was minimal and the risks were tremendous.  Information 
technology on the other hand, had enormous potential and the last few decades have 
witnessed the burgeoning of computer applications in virtually every area life.  As compared 
to nuclear power, say, the risks associated with information technology are minimal, while its 
benefits are, and have been, considerable.  Biotechnology differs from nuclear and 
information technology in that it combines characteristics of both.  On one hand, the ability 
of transgenic science to alter, improve or change our lives is as great, if not greater than that 
of the applications of information technology.  On the other hand, the risks this science 
potentially subjects people to are as widespread and far-reaching as those caused by nuclear 
technology.  Many of the risks genetic manipulation might expose society to are unknown 
and have not been widely tested for since there is great uncertainty as to how to conduct such 
tests.   
     The enormous potential of biotechnology to produce financial, environmental and health 
benefits has resulted in the confluent evolution of biotechnology as a science and as an 
industry. Bauer and Gaskell suggest that international businesses and companies control 
progress in transgenic science since “the development and exploitation of genetic engineering 
techniques is the focus for a growing ‘biotechnology movement’ at the core of which is a 
scientific-industrial complex” (380).19 The benefits or challenges of this scientific-industrial 
complex are not an issue I will discuss further, nor will I include an account of the ethical 
issues such a construct raises.  The fact that this integrated relationship exists emphasizes the 
crucial role of risk assessment in informing public policy and the reliance on the information 
                                                 
     19 See also Arundel 98, Colman 33 and Rifkin 15-24. 
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it can provide. As companies invest more money into rDNA technology, putting these 
products onto the market in order to profit from their investments becomes a priority.  In 
order to get their genetically modified (GM) innovations approved by regulatory bodies, 
companies typically must provide risk assessments.  According to Dhanda these assessments 
are based on the premise that “a product should not be released until any and all of the 
negative effects are found to be absent, and in the case of uncertainty, a company should err 
strongly on the side of precaution and not release the product” (64). In practice, however, this 
is often not the case.  
     Regulators and policy makers rely on the risk information provided by the biotechnology 
companies to assess the safety of their products.  Until a product has met a defined safety 
measure, it will not move beyond a controlled setting.  Since corporate interests play such a 
crucial role in GM innovation, scientists working outside the biotech industry have had little 
exposure to new products by the time they are considered for release.  As a result, risk 
assessment serves as the primary source of information and replaces external and independent 
peer review and experimental replication as a means of evaluation.  Canadian regulation and 
policy has evolved to include the nexus of industry, risk and biotechnology.  Doern and Reed 
report that, based on information from the Centre for Medicines Research International, 
if Canada wishes to be an innovative leader in emerging sectors like biotechnology, it 
will have to evolve more efficient and effective science-based regulatory capacity 
capable of fostering industrial competitiveness in global markets while protecting its 
citizens from avoidable risks (14). 
 
In the case of agricultural biotechnology for instance, the introductions of genetically 
modified crops in North America “were preceded by a comprehensive safety analysis and 
decision making process carried out in science-based ways by companies, government 
agencies, and scientific expert panels” (Horsch 29).   
      Risk assessment is value-laden and the emphasis that is placed on risk assessment to 
guide our approach to regulating the release of transgenic organisms into the environment 
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must take this into account.  While in Canada acceptable risk thresholds are primarily 
dictated by federal legislation, the value assumptions at work in risk assessment remain 
unacknowledged and largely unarticulated.20     
 
3.4  The Risks of Biotechnology 
 
     I have claimed that risk assessment is crucial to the regulation of biotechnology.  
Understanding major risks inherent in rDNA technology highlights the necessity of relying 
on probabilistic quantitative measure of riskiness.  With such a relatively new science, many 
of the anticipated risks might result from it have never been faced before.  The potential for 
widespread and multi-generational effects has given rise to the call for caution in the 
implementation of biotechnology applications.    
    Concern about the safety or rDNA technology was first addressed when animal cells and 
viruses were incorporated into research.  In 1971, Paul Berg intended to insert the genes of a 
cancer-causing virus (a lambda virus containing SV40 genes) into very common bacteria 
(Escherichia coli) that could readily infect the human intestine.  Robert Pollack, a geneticist 
also researching rDNA techniques, thought that should this bacteria containing the cancer-
causing gene escape from the laboratory it might infect people, with potentially serious 
consequences (Yount 9).  This incident lead the scientists involved to recommend that 
experiments using recombinant technology should be halted until the potential hazards were 
evaluated.  The subsequent conference to address the possible safety concerns of rDNA 
technology, held at Asilomar and involving 140 molecular biologists and geneticists, lead to 
the creation of a set of guidelines which were to govern transgenic science.  Four categories 
of riskiness were identified and helped divide recombinant research.  “Category P1 
                                                 
     20 This is particularly evident in the regulation of plants with novel traits by the Plant Biosafety Office 
division of Agriculture Canada.  
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experiments presented minimal risk to humans and required no precautions beyond those in 
normal laboratory practice, whereas those in category P4 potentially were highly dangerous” 
(Yount 9). This shows that the reliance on the analysis of risk has been an integral component 
of genomic science almost from its inception.  The understanding of GM products and 
organisms is often generated and expressed by characterizations of their riskiness.  
Biotechnology produces both organisms that will be confined to the laboratory for research or 
clinical use and some that will be released into the environment or consumed by people.  It is 
often driven by the market potential of new developments.  In the case of agricultural 
biotechnology for instance, a potentially risky product would be unsuccessful when offered to 
consumers.  Distinguishing between transgenic organisms that are safe enough for release 
from those that are not depends on accurate risk assessments.  The identification of the 
potential riskiness inherent in rDNA technology was a key component to the development of 
the genetics.  
      Current knowledge about DNA and the functioning of genes is incomplete, although 
advances are made much more rapidly than is the norm in fields like physics or chemistry.  It 
is not unusual, however, to attempt to apply techniques based on incomplete knowledge and, 
in fact, these applications can often enhance our scientific understanding.  In the case of 
rDNA technology this has been particularly true since it is not known how much of an effect 
one gene might have on other distally located genes when transferred from one organism to 
another.  There has been so little experience with genetic manipulation that many of the 
effects it produces are surprising yet this has not slowed the development of technological 
applications (Yount 11).21  Rather than setting the pace for development, surprising or poorly 
understood results occur alongside applications and this produces risks that are also poorly 
understood.  Moreover, there are many applications of biotechnology and thus there are many 
                                                 
21 See also Bereano 27-28. 
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different types of risk associated with these applications.  As described in Chapter Two, this 
means that the risks posed by biotechnology must be assessed under uncertainty.  
     The risks associated with GM innovations can be broadly categorized into three groups: 
risks to human health, to ecological integrity and, to society. Concerns about health usually 
arise from the consumption of GM foods or the use of pharmaceuticals produced through 
rDNA technology.  Ecological risks include gene flow, or the uncontrolled spread of 
transgenic plants into surrounding wild populations.  Other ecological concerns include the 
loss of genetic diversity, increased reliance on pesticides, and harm to nontarget organisms.  
Societal and economic risks can occur when a long-standing system of farming or 
manufacture is replaced by the introduction of GM crops.  The usurpation of traditional 
farming methods and local economy by large, profit-driven corporate interests can lead to 
social and economic upheavals in developing countries.22
     There are also risks associated with not allowing the development of biotechnology to 
occur.  Advances in transgenic science can be used to alleviate a number of problems 
affecting throughout the world ranging from starvation in drought-stricken regions to a 
variety of diseases.  Over-regulating biotechnology or severely limiting its applications could 
result in missed opportunities to benefit many people.  Any knowledge that might be gained 
from the use of biotechnology could be lost if transgenic science is severely restricted.  This 
knowledge also benefits other scientific fields and enhances the general understanding of 
how biological systems evolve and interact.  Only a small number of the potential benefits of 
biotechnology have been identified and fewer still have been realized.  It is vital that these 
benefits be considered along with their potential risks, and it should also be recognized that 
there are risks associated with the failure to explore biotechnology both as a science and as a 
solution to some widespread problems.   
                                                 
     22 A more detailed discussion of these risks can be found in Yarrow 41-43. 
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     In general, risks in biotechnology centre on the fact that little is known about how new or 
novel organisms interact with their new environments when they are released.  Often 
potential problems are not, and cannot, be detected immediately, which makes determining 
how risky they might be very challenging.  Barnum summarizes some of the more common 
risks that the public and scientists express concern over which include: 
that genetically modifying plants and animals will turn benign organisms into 
economically destructive pests or will enhance existing pests through hybridization 
(sexual out-crossing common in plants); that new biotechnology products (plant 
pesticides, for example) may cause harm to nontarget species such as insects; that a 
recombinant virus used in the production of recombinant organisms might 
detrimentally infect other organisms; that recombinant organisms may eliminate 
indigenous species through competition, depletion of valuable resources and nutrients, 
and by incomplete degradation of toxic wastes to even more toxic by-products during 
bioremediation (195). 
 
Many of these risks are unique to the different areas of biotechnological applications but this 
is in no way an exhaustive list.  In agricultural biotechnology for instance, risks also include 
increased weediness or gene flow from the novel crop to wild species or non-transgenic crops 
as well as loss of diversity in plants, which increases their susceptibility to pathogens.  There 
are also allergenicity and toxicity risks associated with transgenic food and genetic risks in 
the case of gene therapy.   
      I have identified three broad categories of biotechnological risk.  The first two, risks to 
human health and ecological stability, are the primary focus of risk assessment in the 
Canadian regulatory regime.  Social and economic risks can be just as damaging, however. 
Increased costs associated with improved crops or food can have a devastating effect on poor 
farmers.  A shift in the autonomy of farmers in developing countries who may become 
dependent on large biotechnology companies for the improved seeds can change the structure 
of a society.  Not all of these socio-economic risks are quantifiable or easy to measure and 
thus they are usually excluded from risk assessment although they may be given 
consideration after analyzable risks are assessed.   
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     Another problem is the lack of knowledge of how to contain or deal with its risks once 
they occur.  In the case of microorganisms, genetic modifications that go awry can be dealt 
with by eradicating the novel strain but with organisms such as plants or animals, eradication 
is often not a viable option.     
    
3.5  Biotechnology Regulation in Canada 
 
     The role of risk assessment in regulation is not only a key component to the progress of 
biotechnology, but the information it produces also provides the basis for regulatory decision-
making about agricultural biotechnology in Canada. The approach taken by the Canadian 
system of regulation is different from that of other countries, however, because the trigger for 
regulation is not merely genetic modification.  Regulation occurs when a product contains 
any novel trait regardless of the process used to confer that trait to the organism.  Although 
this difference provides a useful way of enforcing and addressing regulatory issues, it is 
problematic for any system to rely on risk assessment without providing a means of 
addressing its value-ladenness.  In this discussion I focus on the regulation of GM plants and 
foods since there is an emphasis in agricultural biotechnology on transparency and open 
access to data, but the processes outlined typify the Canadian approach to biotechnology 
regulation in general. 
     In Canada, biotechnology regulation and policy development is “science-based”.  Science-
based policy and regulation can be defined as policy and regulatory decision making where 
scientific knowledge and personnel constitute significant or effective inputs into, or are 
distinctive features of the relevant decision-making process” (Doern and Reed 5). Thus, 
decisions concerning the application and use of GMOs are primarily based on scientific 
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assessments about their safety.23  Doern and Reed contend that despite cuts to both funding 
and the number of scientists involved in regulatory and policy functions, there is an 
increasing dependence of government upon science (8).  Since risk assessment of new 
technologies is integral to the science upon which the policy and regulatory regime depend, it 
is a central component to regulation. 
     Biotechnology also results in the emergence of new types of risks, creating changes in the 
traditional risk-benefit calculus.  As the risk paradigm evolves to include scientific and 
technological advances, “more and more, regulators have to deal analytically, 
organizationally, and politically with risk assessment, risk management proper, and risk 
communication” (Doern and Reed 11). Thus, Canada’s system of regulation relies on risk 
assessment to aid government officials to make decisions concerning the release of transgenic 
organisms. The value assumptions that I have argued are endemic to risk assessment, 
however, go unnoticed and unchecked.  Risk, risk assessment, and the practice of science are 
not intrinsically objective or observer-independent and therefore Canadian regulation and 
policy incorporate value-laden assessments of biotechnological risks.  The reliance on 
scientific data to inform policy is grounded in the assumption that the data are objective and 
therefore can be relied upon to guide decisions concerning the use of this controversial 
technology.  Ethical considerations occur separately from risk assessment and consequently 
little thought is given to whether or not the assessment of risk should be included in the 
broader ethical framework.  In her study of the circumstances surrounding the rejection of 
Monsanto’s application to the Canadian government for registration of recombinant bovine 
growth hormone, Mills argues, “the problems in the relationship between science and policy 
arise at the point at which judgements are made about the implications of the data” (158). 
These data are thought to be value-free when in fact they are not.  Policy judgements are 
                                                 
     23 Further discussion about science-based regulation of technology occurs in Carlsson 26 and Senker 53-68. 
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made using value-laden data and these values are those of the company, scientist or 
institution that produces them. 
      Regulation in Canada differs from that of other countries because the trigger to regulatory 
oversight is not genetic modification per se but the existence of novel traits based on 
substantial equivalence (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 5).24 Therefore, if a 
plant or animal possesses a trait that has not been identified before or approved for release, 
(i.e. it is not substantially equivalent to something that has already been approved) it is 
considered to be a novel trait and therefore is subject to regulation.  Today, a number of 
government bodies are involved in Canadian regulation, such as the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA).  The CFIA was created in 1997 and “is the lead governmental 
bureau in Canada devoted to the regulation of animal, food and plant health as well as 
consumer safety in regards to the labelling and packaging of food products” (Prince 208). 
Rather than creating new policy or procedure, agencies like the CFIA utilize existing 
frameworks of regulation and modify them accordingly to address the unique issues 
associated with GMOs.  In the case of plants with novel traits (PNTs) for instance, which 
include GM plants, the developer is required to submit the results of a series of field trials 
before a PNT is approved for unconfined release.  At this point, 
“CFIA science evaluators also conduct a critical review of a scientific information 
package submitted by the proponent.  Each application for approval is evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis that incorporates an examination of the biological processes 
involved as well as the environmental impact, primarily on agricultural and natural 
ecosystems…An authorization for an unconfined release is granted only when CFIA 
has determined that any environmental risks associated with the release of any novel 
plant are acceptable and/or manageable” (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee 8). 
 
Where the trigger for regulation in general is the existence of a novel trait, the trigger for the 
approval of a PNT or a GMO, is an assessment of its associated risks. 
                                                 
     24 Substantial equivalence is the concept that “if a new food or food component is found to be substantially 
equivalent to an existing food or food component, it can be treated in the same manner with respect to safety” 
(CBAC 25).  This definition refers specifically to genetically modified foods but can be adapted to include other 
genetically modified organisms. 
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     The CFIA was created to consolidate the regulatory functions previously located in four 
departments—Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Health Canada, the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans and, Industry Canada.  Through the use of a safety-based approach, the 
CFIA regulates agricultural products, which “includes determining whether a risk assessment 
is required, performing a risk assessment, implementing risk management, and administering 
the pertinent regulatory measures” (Prince 220). Although the task of risk assessment 
ostensibly belongs to the CFIA, the consolidation of a number of regulatory bodies combined 
with a recent shift in the functions of inspectors, places this role in the hands of proponents.25 
The changes in the Canadian regulatory regime in the last few years have made it more 
difficult to identify the value assumptions that inform the data decision-makers rely on.  The 
problems with value assumptions in risk assessment are in fact exacerbated under the new 
system of regulation as I demonstrate through a discussion of case studies in the following 
chapter. 
     One of the recent changes in regulation has centred on redefining the role of regulators.  In 
an effort to offset some of the costs associated with regulation and inspection, there has been 
a shift from the role of regulatory inspectors to that of auditors.   
The CFIA is moving away from a traditional approach to regulation, hands-on 
inspection by different levels and agencies of government, product by product, 
towards an inspection system across commodities that relies more on 
intergovernmental partnerships and on industry responsibilities for quality controls, 
with government inspectors auditing those controls based on scientific assessments of 
acceptable risk (Prince 209). 
 
This shift is particularly significant since it places more control in the hands of proponents.  
Risk assessments are conducted and paid for by proponents according to a set of risk 
parameters set by the government, and regulators audit this information to see whether or not 
the product complies with standard safety requirements.  Although the CFIA is conducting 
                                                 
     25 This is something I will explain in depth in the next chapter using the CFIA’s regulatory procedures as a 
case study demonstrating biotechnology regulation in Canada. 
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part of the risk assessment, the proponent produces the data they use.  Thus, there is a split in 
the process of risk assessment, part of which is conducted by the proponent and part by the 
regulators.  Contrary to the position maintained by the CFIA, risk assessment under this new 
regime of regulation concludes in the offices of CFIA, but it begins in the laboratories of the 
proponents. Additionally, having regulators acting as auditors exacerbates the problems with 
making critical decisions about which risks society will face based on value-laden 
information.  Auditing risk data limits the role of regulators and removes them from the data 
collection and production processes.   
     Mills asserts that basic research is precluded from the mandate of regulatory scientists and 
moreover, due to their commitments to uphold confidentiality and proprietary agreements, 
they have limited communication with those outside the regulatory body.  The CFIA states 
that it uses both internal and external expertise and “the regulatory process as a whole has 
been subject to extensive consultations with stakeholders over a number of years designed to 
keep the evaluation process at the CFIA current” (Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
“Questions and Answers”).  If external experts are consulted about a specific product, 
however, regulatory scientists bounded by proprietary agreements are not free to solicit 
advice about details or evidence specific to the case they are reviewing.  In addition, 
regulatory scientists must operate under time constraints and be conscious not only of 
corporate costs and undue regulatory burdens but also of the necessity of protecting public 
health.   
     Mills further claims that distinctions between what is reasonable and what is unreasonable 
are used to define safety within the regulatory system.  She notes that if the risk can already 
be explained on the basis of existing knowledge, then scientists involved in regulatory 
decisions are unlikely to ask for further data.  Therefore objectivity arising from the exchange 
of information within the scientific community is unlikely in the current regulatory regime.  
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The move from inspecting to auditing, the proprietary agreements regulatory scientists are 
bound by, and the pressures these scientists face, all suggest that the Canadian system of 
regulating biotechnology and its applications is moving in the wrong direction if it is to 
address the problems of value-laden risk assessment.  
      The changes in biotechnology regulation have also been accompanied by the creation of 
an advisory committee which attempts to address the ethical concerns associated with the 
release of GM products, and which has an indirect impact on regulation. In order to address 
the growing ethical concerns associated with biotechnology, the Canadian government has 
created the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC), with the goal of 
providing a framework for formulating public policy recommendations.  This framework is 
meant to serve as a means through which to view public policy regulating GMOs in Canada. 
The primary function of CBAC has thus far been to produce a set of comprehensive 
recommendations for improving the regulation of GMOs (in particular, GM food).  
Significantly, in the 2002 report on the regulation of GM foods, CBAC recommended that 
“regulatory authorities maintain and strengthen Canada’s risk-based approach to the 
regulation of novel foods and plants with novel traits” and that pre-market risk assessment 
should be employed using a precautionary approach “to ensure the application of a 
conservative safety standard in assessing health and environmental risks related to GM and 
other novel foods, recognizing that this does no imply ‘zero risk’”(xv).  
     CBAC also recommends the employment of precaution when risks associated with a GM 
product or processes are recognized.  Although there is no specific mention of risk 
assessment, many of the suggestions centre on issues of transparency and the need to make 
risk data available to the public.  In fact, one of the recommendations made by CBAC 
suggests, “the views of external experts be incorporated in the product evaluation process 
where the risk assessment is not straightforward or where a precedent might be set by 
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approval of the product” (xv).  This is significant for two reasons.  First, I have argued that 
the idea of objectivity as it has been standardly understood in science and risk assessment is 
difficult to uphold but an enriched understanding of objectivity suggests that unbiased data 
can be produced through peer review and scrutiny within the scientific community.  
Secondly, I have claimed that value-assumptions are endemic to risk assessment.  The fact 
that CBAC supports a risk-based regulatory regime, yet recommends that external peer 
review might only be necessary in certain situations, suggests that there is a mistaken 
underlying assumption that risk assessment as it is currently structured is objective in the 
sense of being value-free.  Therefore, both the regulators and the advisory committee, which 
indirectly influence the risks we will face from the use of GM products, do not recognize that 
the risk assessments, upon which we rely to protect us from harm, are value-laden.   
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
     In this chapter I have outlined some of the reasons why risk assessment is crucial to the 
evolution and advancement of scientific knowledge in biotechnology.  The risks associated 
with transgenic science are unique in that they are far-reaching, often irrevocable and 
widespread across space and time, necessitate a system of regulation that can accommodate 
these risks.  The fact that there is a biotechnology-industry complex means there is a reliance 
on the assessments of risks to proceed in making policies that determine how much harm 
society will be subjected to since much of the research is no longer conducted in the public 
sphere but is protected by intellectual property agreements.  Additionally, the biotechnology-
industry complex has the potential to create a regulatory system that is industry-driven and so 
unbiased information is needed to help determine policy.  This ensures that the risks faced are 
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not influenced solely by the values of those directly involved in the production of GM 
products. 
     The Canadian system of regulation is risk-based and therefore the role of risk assessment 
is crucial to policy development.  The regulatory system has undergone some significant 
changes in the last five years in an attempt to improve efficiency, reduce costs and 
consolidate a number of disparate departments to a central few.  As a result, in the case of the 
CFIA, what has developed is a proponent-driven, industry-based system, which has limited 
the role of inspectors to that of auditors.  This change makes the consideration of deeper 
conceptual questions about risk assessment much more difficult to address since the 
dependence on risk data removes the ability of regulators to ask questions about how this data 
is collected and what assumptions have been made.   
     The creation of CBAC has not been sufficient to counter this shift in the wrong direction 
by regulators.  Nor has it adequately acknowledged the value assumptions present in risk 
assessment.  CBAC has no regulatory authority or legislative power so it is unable to alleviate 
the problems of value-laden risk assessment and the shifting role of regulators.  It does, 
however, provide a forum in which issues of value-ladenness might be addressed.  I will 
discuss the role of CBAC in my recommendations to address the problem in the final chapter. 
    The use of risk assessment to guide regulation and policy decisions is a very useful way to 
make sense of a technology that has both technical applications and practical applications to 
daily life.  The characterization of the impact of such a new technology on the environment 
and society is best expressed as risk.  In the quest for a transparent regulatory system, risk 
assessment is very powerful tool as it makes difficult, complex scientific knowledge 
accessible to the public.  Since the risks of biotechnology will be faced by all of society, it is 
vital that the risk assessments of transgenic products are objective.  Value-laden risk 
assessments do not include the values of everyone that will be affected by the release of a 
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GMO.  Therefore, what is needed is a regulatory system to address the problems associated 
with value assumptions in risk assessment.  It is also necessary to discard the idealistic view 
of objectivity as an inherent characteristic of science and replace it with the view that 
objectivity is a social construct.  In doing so, it is possible to incorporate the values that 
reflect the view of the majority into assessments of risk. 
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 4. Case Studies 
 
     4.1 Introduction 
 
 
     In this chapter I will discuss three case studies to demonstrate several ways in which risk 
assessment is value-laden.  These cases show that the Canadian regulatory system does not 
adequately address the problems inherent in relying on the idealized view of the objectivity of 
risk assessment to make policy decisions about the release of transgenic organisms.  Risk  
assessment is value-laden in a number of ways and each case discussed will highlight the 
features which I consider to be most important in regulation.  Value assumptions occur at two 
major levels:  the internal and the external levels.   
     By the internal level I mean the assumptions that scientists must make in the laboratory 
while conducting assessments of risk.  Value assumptions are a necessary part of the 
production of risk data and therefore, scientists must make decisions involving normative 
issues in order to do risk assessment.  The influences, which inform the values at this level, 
are predominantly internal—either from within the laboratory, the government agency or 
individual scientist.  Thus the values that scientists must adopt, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, in making assumptions will necessarily influence the assumptions they make.  
Similarly, if that scientist is working for a corporation or government agency with a certain 
mandate (protection of health and safety for example), then, once again, the scientist 
conducting the risk assessment will be influenced by this goal when making assumptions.      
      The external level on the other hand, includes influences from the world outside the lab.  
Economics, politics or personal motivations are all external influences affecting the 
assumptions made during risk assessment.  Scientists are not segregated from their 
surrounding communities and therefore controversies and debates over for example, the use 
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of a new technology, or the desire to be the first country to release a potentially beneficial 
product, cannot be dismissed.  Assessors are aware that the results of their work will have a 
direct impact on whether or not a product is approved for regulation and this will have an 
effect on the assumptions they make. Value assumptions made at both the internal and 
external levels of risk assessment affect the outcome of regulatory decision-making.           
     The first case I discuss will briefly give an account of the controversy surrounding the 
herbicide Alachlor, produced by Monsanto, as reported by Brunk, Haworth and Lee in 1991.  
New information regarding the safety of Alachlor caused a re-evaluation of its use in Canada.  
This case involves value assumptions made at the internal level of risk assessment—those 
that occurred from direct influences within the laboratory during the actual production of risk 
data.  The controversy surrounding the regulation of Alachlor was precipitated by three 
different consequences of the use of value-laden risk assessment.  At the time, regulation in 
Canada was different than it is today.  The consolidation of various departments into the 
CFIA (for agricultural biotechnology), which was discussed in Chapter Three, had not 
occurred and regulators had a more direct role in the assessment process.  The circumstances 
of this case demonstrate that even when regulators had a hands-on approach to inspection, the 
value assumptions endemic to risk reports were unacknowledged.  As I argued in the 
previous chapter, this problem has only been amplified by regulatory changes since 1997.  
     The second case concerns the regulation of recombinant bovine growth hormone (rbGH) 
in both Canada and the United States.  In this case value assumptions are made at the external 
level and I will describe the effects they had on regulatory decisions.  Mills provides a 
thorough account of the circumstances surrounding the application by Monsanto to register 
rbGH.  She also outlines some of the reasons why regulators in Canada decided to reject the 
application while their American counterparts approved it.  Mills argues that the decisions, 
based on identical sets of data, were ultimately based on the value judgements made during 
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the assessment process and the political and economic context under which scientists and 
regulators worked in both countries. The background influences and social pressures 
surrounding the entire regulatory process during the assessment of this hormone resulted in 
assumptions that were contextually and geographically dependent.  The assumptions 
regulators in the United States made during their assessments were significantly different 
from those of their Canadian counterparts and, thus, the conclusions they drew were also 
different.    
     Despite the significant effect value assumptions had in the first two cases, there is a 
marked lack of recognition of their importance by the government, industry and the public.  I 
include the public since the risks imposed by biotechnology are broad in scope, as discussed 
in the previous chapter.  The regulation of biotechnology must involve the concerns of 
scientists, proponents and the public—those who will ultimately be faced with the risks. The 
very recent application for the use of genetically modified wheat in Canada will be the third 
case I discuss. The GM wheat case involves assumptions made at both the external and 
internal levels. The most current debate in the regulation of GM crops is partly based on the 
widely held view that risk assessment is value-free.  It is clear from the first two case studies 
that a failure to recognize that value assumptions are made, at both the internal and external 
levels, causes a shift in the controversy.  Rather than focusing on whose values should be 
considered in a debate over GM products, and how to rank them in importance, 
disagreements occur over the ‘purity’ of scientific risk assessment.  
       Since the GM wheat application was made in December 2002, the regulatory process is 
still under way and therefore few specific details are available.  The controversy over the use 
of GM wheat makes this an interesting case since it is so recent and some of the same 
circumstances surrounding the Alachlor and the rbGH cases have begun to develop.  An 
additional factor occurs in this case that is not present in the others, however.  The application 
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for regulatory approval of GM wheat has created debates about which risks are relevant to 
regulation.  Canadian wheat growers are very concerned about the economic risks the 
introduction of this crop will impose on an already economically strained farming sector.  
American producers on the other hand, insist that economic considerations have no bearing 
on the regulation of new products since they might sully the ‘purely scientific’ process of risk 
assessment.  Part of the ongoing debate over GM wheat centres, then, on the widely held 
view that risk assessment is objective and contains acknowledgement of either the internal or 
external value assumptions.  Since 1998, there has been a bilateral agreement between 
Canada and the United States to collaborate and harmonize some of the features of 
biotechnology regulation.  Combined with the recent changes and shifts in the Canadian 
regulatory system and the lack of acknowledgement of the role value assumptions play in risk 
assessment, this agreement puts added pressure on regulators while they decide the fate of 
GM wheat.   
     These case studies are used to show how the two levels of value assumptions I have 
identified affect the outcomes of risk assessment and thus have a direct impact on regulatory 
decisions based on these assessments.  Although regulation centers on risk data and reports, 
regulators make no attempt to counter the value assumptions they incorporate and, in 
practice, rely upon.  The value assumptions made by risk assessors bias the data regulators 
use when deciding which products will be made available to the public.  This data is not 
objective, in the sense of value-free, if it is influenced by these assumptions.  As I have 
argued, in questions of which risks society will face, objectivity is a desirable quality in the 
information used to make such critical decisions about safety.  Risk assessment is the one of 
the only methods available to assess the safety of new technologies and products.  If what I 
have claimed is true, that risk assessment is value-laden in various ways that I have broadly 
categorized into internal and external levels of value-ladenness, then the untenable notion that 
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risk assessment is objective should be rejected.  At all stages of risk assessment objectivity 
fails.  Objectivity arising from social discourse as Longino suggests, however, is a good way 
to address the use of value-laden risk data.  Current changes to regulatory procedures in 
Canada, and the move from a system of inspection to auditing in the last five years, have 
exacerbated the problems of value-ladenness. The process of risk assessment requires that 
certain value assumptions be made in order to interpret the results of a particular situation. 
The social context within which biotechnological risks must be considered dictates that the 
values determining assumptions in risk assessment are not necessarily those of the majority.  
This is also a concern when one considers the unique nature of the risks associated with 
biotechnology.  The widespread and long-term effects of biotechnology expose everyone to 
its associated risks and, therefore, decisions about regulation and policy should not be based 
on the assumption that risk assessments are value-free.   
 
4.2 The Alachlor Controversy 
 
     This case does not involve rDNA technology although it does demonstrate two points of 
central importance to the discussion of risk assessment in biotechnology. First, it provides an 
overview of Canada’s approach to the regulation of technology and its products.26  
Specifically, it shows how regulation occurred before the consolidation of many small 
departments into six large ones, and the shift in the role of regulators occurred in the late 
1990’s.  Second, and more importantly, it shows that Monsanto and the Health Protection 
Branch (HPB) of Health and Welfare Canada made very different value assumptions about 
risk, which were affected by very different background influences.  The assumptions made in 
this case were at the internal level since they were driven primarily by the mandates of 
                                                 
     26 Although this case occurred in the 1980s and the Canadian regulatory system has changed since then, I 
think it still provides a general overview of how regulation still occurs.  The specific methodology of regulation 
may have changed but the approach Canadian regulators take remains the same. 
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Monsanto and the HPB.  Since each institution had different goals, their results were 
markedly different. These differences produced drastically different assessments of the risks 
of Alachlor.   This highlights the problems that arise from internal value assumptions made 
during the process of risk assessment, particularly when these assumptions go unrecognized 
or unchecked.   
     The Alachlor case, in effect, provides a template for discussing the differences both in 
value assumptions brought to bear on risk assessment itself and the background values, which 
help to determine which values will be in play during assessment.  Therefore, it provides a 
general picture of similar problems, which could arise when internal value assumptions go 
unrecognized in the regulation of biotechnology and its products.  I will use this case to argue 
that values influence the outcome of risk assessment at the level of data collection and 
production. The Alachlor case shows that data produced through scientific analysis 
nonetheless requires that a number of normative assumptions are made.  
     Brunk, Haworth and Lee examine the cancellation of the registration by the Canadian 
Government of an herbicide called Alachlor produced by Monsanto.27  The decision to cancel 
its registration was based on risk assessments conducted by both Monsanto and the Health 
Protection Branch (HPB) of Health and Welfare Canada.  The assessment by Monsanto 
suggested there was very little risk to human health posed by the use of Alachlor while the 
HPB found that there was significant risk.  Both assessments were based on the same data but 
very different assumptions were made during the review of the herbicide.  For example, 
Monsanto assumed that every reasonable precaution would be taken by applicators to reduce 
exposure while the HPB assumed that most applicators would take very minimal precautions. 
Brunk, Haworth and Lee state,  
the conclusions generated by risk assessment are necessarily based upon important 
normative assumptions, discuss the differences in these assumptions, and the very 
                                                 
     27 A complete account of this case is given in Brunk, Haworth and Lee (1991). 
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different conclusions drawn from them.  These are necessary, not only in order to 
bridge the gaps created by the nature of regulatory science, but also, surprisingly, in 
the very conduct of risk assessment itself (237).   
 
They found that many of these normative assumptions were unavoidable and that divergence 
in the assumptions made was very influential in determining whether or not Alachlor posed a 
significant health risk to humans.  
     Alachlor is a chemical herbicide produced and manufactured by Monsanto Corporation to 
control the growth of weeds in corn and soybean fields.  It had been in use in Canada since 
1969 but in 1985 sales of Alachlor were stopped after Agriculture Canada cancelled its 
registration.  The removal of Alachlor from the market was based on information from a risk 
assessment conducted by the HPB, which showed that it produced a serious risk of cancer to 
farm workers who applied the chemical.  A Scientific Review Board, assembled to address 
Monsanto’s appeal to this decision, later found that the government had overestimated the 
risk of Alachlor and recommended that its registration be reinstated.  Upon comparison of the 
different reports of Alachlor’s risks, however, it was found by the HPB that the use of this 
product was not safe due to its association with the induction of cancerous tumours in rats. 
Studies on rats are used to estimate effects on humans and therefore evidence of 
carcinogenicity in laboratory rats is considered a good indicator that a chemical will cause 
cancer in humans. 
     The risk of cancer that an applicator faced from the use of Alachlor was the focus of the 
risk assessments conducted by HPB and Monsanto in response to the new information 
regarding its carcinogenicity.   
[The risk of carcinogenicity] was based upon two basic estimates:  the first of the 
quantity of Alachlor sufficient to induce cancer in humans, the second of the levels of 
exposure likely to be experienced by those who come into contact with Alachlor.  The 
evidence suggested that 2.5 mg/kg/day was sufficient to induce tumours in rats.  Since 
there was little or no direct evidence concerning the effects of the chemical in 
humans, 2.5 mg/kg/day was simply accepted as the best estimate of a potentially 
carcinogenic dose, and attention thus focused on the question of likely human 
exposures (Brunk, Haworth and Lee 237). 
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Both HPB and Monsanto dealt with questions of exposure by developing reasonable worst-
case scenarios.  Brunk, Haworth and Lee report that HPB suggested applicators would 
possibly face an exposure of 2.7 mg/kg/day, which is above the acceptable level.  On the 
other hand, Monsanto suggested exposure levels of 0.0000009 mg/kg/day, which were almost 
seven orders of magnitude less that HPB’s estimate.  The Review Board’s exposure rate falls 
in between 0.001 and 0.0001 mg/kg/day.  This broad range of exposure estimated was shown 
by Brunk, Haworth and Lee to be a result of differing value assumptions and not from 
differing facts. 
     The influences of the value assumptions made during the assessment of risk are 
pronounced and Brunk, Haworth and Lee suggest three levels of generality in the 
assumptions made.  The first, and most general level, involved the way assessors prioritized 
different values.  Economic benefits and market freedom were of primary concern for 
Monsanto and of some concern to the Review Board.  HPB on the other hand, was more 
sensitive to human health and less concerned with economic factors.  Brunk, Haworth and 
Lee claim the Review Board’s focus on such factors was based on normative assumptions 
such as a pro-technology stance, a liberal view of the political order and an instrumental view 
of rationality (239).  As a result, the Board’s assessment of the risks associated with Alachlor 
was conducted within the value framework such assumptions formed.  The HPB operated 
under a safety-based value framework. 
     The second level of generality according to Brunk, Haworth and Lee involved both 
conditionally and inherently normative issues.28  They claim that the differences in exposure 
rates do not represent different measurements of actual exposure since they were based on the 
                                                 
     28 Brunk, Haworth and Lee describe decisions as conditionally normative when they are made based on 
values because there is insufficient scientific data available.  Thus, Monsanto’s desire to protect their economic 
interests led assessors to make decisions about amortization based on conditionally normative issues.  They 
explain that inherently normative issues are those that are based on ‘normalizing’ assumptions such as whether 
or not protective clothing would be worn and if so, whether or not it would be of good quality.  These issues are 
normative regardless of the amount or type of available empirical data. 
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same data, which were subjected to different assumptions (239).  They argue that, in the face 
of uncertainties, decisions must be made by employing the values one wants to protect, 
therefore in situations like this, decisions are conditionally normative since values “come into 
play only in the conditions where there is not enough information available to decide the 
issue on the basis of the scientific data alone” (241).  The assessors in this case were required 
to make decisions with many uncertainties in factual details, such as the amount of protective 
clothing worn.  The definite conclusions the assessors were required to make were guided by 
the values they wanted to protect. 
     The differences in estimates were due primarily to assumptions made about the amount of 
protective clothing worn by the applicators, how often they would apply Alachlor each year 
and over how many years they would apply it.  The HPB assumed that no protective clothing 
would be worn while Monsanto assumed full protective clothing would be worn as indicated 
on the product warning label.29 Another assumption concerned whether or not exposure to the 
herbicide should be amortized.30 “Amortization minimizes exposure estimates; not 
amortizing maximizes them. Monsanto and the Review Board, sensitive to the projected 
economic benefits of Alachlor, amortized; HPB, conceiving itself as the guardian of health, 
did not” (242).  These assumptions were used to create an overall scenario of exposure by the 
assessors and thus greatly affected the estimates of exposure levels applicators were expected 
to face.  The HPB’s scenario led assessors to make estimates of exposure much greater than 
those made by Monsanto’s assessors.   
     In addition to conditionally normative issues, Brunk, Haworth and Lee also discuss the 
effect of inherently normative issues.  Assumptions about these issues included decisions 
about the quality of protective clothing worn or the integrity of surrounding wells and their 
                                                 
     29 Brunk, Haworth and Lee discuss a number of assumptions made but since they are quite technical I will 
not mention them here. 
     30 Brunk, Haworth and Lee explain that to amortize in this case is to convert a person’s total lifetime 
exposure estimate to Alachlor into a lifetime average daily dose. 
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ability to prevent seepage.  Brunk, Haworth and Lee maintain that identifying these issues as 
inherently normative rather than empirical is due the fact that there is no standard practice 
regarding protective clothing among Canadian farmers.  Some will wear protective clothing, 
some will not and others will wear clothing of varying degrees of quality.   
So the question is not that of determining the level of exposure under a certain 
condition, but rather that of determining which exposure condition we should take as 
representing the risk of Alachlor to applicators.  It is a matter of first defining the  
‘research worst, medium and best case,’ and then deciding among them, all of which 
requires normative choices (Brunk, Haworth and Lee 244).  
  
Any data or practice concerning the use of protective clothing could be questioned on 
normative grounds because the quality of such gear requires an assumption of what is 
considered 'normal'.  Therefore the extent and quality of the protective gear used by 
applicators is considered inherently, rather than conditionally normative by Brunk, Haworth 
and Lee.   
     The third level of generality in the value assumptions made was the way the adoption of 
certain argumentative strategies by the assessors influenced their values.  Different strategies 
were employed to answer questions about who had the burden of proof, the amount of 
required scientific rigour, and choosing a risk-taking or risk-aversive approach to decision 
making.  Brunk, Haworth and Lee report the HPB adopted a risk-aversive approach, applied a 
rigorous standard for scientific evidence, and assumed that the burden of proof fell on 
Monsanto.  In contrast, the Review Board and Monsanto held that the government needed to 
prove Alachlor was unsafe through rigorous scientific standards and that it had been overly 
cautious in its attempt avoid risk. 
     The different argumentative strategies used in this case demonstrate the common situation 
of assessors in their attempt to develop a set of data upon which critical decisions about the 
use of a product must be made.  Scientists working to develop a set of data will make a 
variety of value assumptions and these values will be determined by various sets of 
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conditions, which may have an influence on their work.  These assumptions must be made in 
the process of risk assessment and cannot be based solely on factual or quantitative evidence.  
Brunk, Haworth and Lee argue that they must be based on the values held by the assessor and 
so they are value-laden.  “The assumptions are value-laden because invoking them exposes 
values held by the assessor, or at least it requires the assessor to take a position in a normative 
debate” (Brunk, Haworth and Lee 245).  I have defined these assumptions as internal because 
the influences at work occur primarily within the lab or work setting.  The values of the 
individual scientist or those of the institution for which they work affect assumptions about 
protective clothing or even amortization during the production of the risk assessment data. 
     The use of Alachlor was determined to pose too great a health risk to farm workers and so 
its registration was cancelled by the HPB.  The reasons for initially approving Alachlor for 
widespread use in Canada are not relevant to my thesis and so I will not discuss them 
although Brunk, Haworth and Lee offer a full account of the case in their work.  The reason 
for removing Alachlor from the market resulted from the comparison of different risk 
assessments conducted with identical evidence.  The important feature here is that identical 
data could produce such disparate conclusions results from the internal value assumptions 
each set of scientists made during the risk assessment.  Although risk assessments produce 
scientific data, often in the confines of a laboratory or office, it is wrong to assume this 
information is value-free.      
     This case shows that two competing sets of values, human health and economic benefits, 
produced significant disparity in risk assessments that were conducted using the same factual 
information.  Brunk, Haworth and Lee conclude that debates about risk involve identifying 
different value-frameworks, conceptions of society, attitudes towards technology and towards 
risk-taking.  Therefore “it raises serious questions about how these debates ought to be 
resolved, and whether their resolution should be put more or less exclusively in the hands of 
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risk assessment experts and other scientists” (Brunk, Haworth and Lee 245).  These are all 
internal value assumptions because people, who conduct the risk assessments, are influenced 
by the mandate of the institution or organization for which they work.  Internal value 
assumptions have an effect on the actual risk data produced.  Therefore, it is incorrect to 
assume that scientists and risk assessment experts are conducting value-free assessments.    
     The Alachlor case shows risk assessments involve many crucial decisions.  These 
decisions require scientists to invoke value assumptions that greatly influence the outcome of 
their work.  Brunk, Haworth and Lee claim that risk assessment is value-laden and therefore 
it cannot be perceived to be politically neutral simply because it involves the production of 
factual information.  The view that risk assessment is objective simply because it involves 
what appears to be factual information is untenable, which is demonstrated in this case since 
decisions made by the different groups of scientists were determined by the differences in the 
background assumptions they made and not in the conclusions that were drawn from the 
evidence.   
     Another important feature of this case is the fact that it occurred in the early to mid 1980s.  
At this point, the current shift in the Canadian regulatory system from inspection to auditing, 
discussed in the previous chapter, had not yet occurred.  Thus, the regulators functioned in 
the capacity of inspectors which meant they conducted hands-on evaluation and had a much 
more active role throughout the assessment of risk.  Regulators have since become auditors 
and the cost of risk assessments has become the responsibility of the proponent.  As a result, 
the value assumptions made during assessments are almost exclusively those of the 
proponent.  Unless an independent risk assessment is performed, these values go unnoticed 
and regulators use this biased information to determine whether or not a product will be 
released.  Maintaining the idea that risk data is objective because it is scientific does not 
address the reality that risk assessment is value-laden.  Internal value assumptions like those 
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made in the Alachlor case obviously have a significant influence on the quantitative 
characterization of risk.    
     The Alachlor case highlights a number of ways in which internal value assumptions have 
real effects in the regulation of technology and its products. The results of risk assessment are 
critical to decision-making and so it is important that these assumptions are identified or at 
least acknowledged.  Scientists must make certain assumptions about many of the parameters 
and conditions involved in any risk assessment.  We rely on purportedly objective 
information to make important decisions about the safety of new technologies, yet the 
necessity of value assumptions in the assessment of risk makes it clear that risk data is not 
value-free.  Had the HBP not conducted their own assessment of Alachlor, there would be no 
reason to question the data produced by Monsanto since risk data is thought to be objective 
and therefore the discrepancies would between the reports would have gone unnoticed.  It is 
necessary to discard this idealized version of objectivity.  Adopting the view that objectivity 
arises through peer review and collaboration makes value-laden risk assessments less 
problematic because it requires consensus from a number of scientists, each with a different 
set of internal value assumptions.     
 
4.3 Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone Regulation in the US and Canada 
 
     Like the Alachlor case, the case of recombinant bovine growth hormone (rbGH) 
regulation demonstrates the real-world consequences that value assumptions have in the 
interpretation of risk data.31  This case is particularly interesting, however, both because it 
specifically involves a product of biotechnology because it shows the real-life implications 
these assumptions have had in the regulatory systems of Canada and the United States.  In the 
                                                 
     31 Other names for this drug are recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) and bovine somatotropin (bST). 
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case of rbGH, it was the external value assumptions that resulted in the differences in 
decisions made by the two regulatory agents.  Mills provides a thorough account of the events 
leading up to the 1999 decision by Health Canada to reject Monsanto’s application to license 
rbGH in Canada despite its approval by the US Federal Drug Administration (FDA) six years 
earlier.  Mills contends that the two different regulatory decisions, again based on the same 
data, show that although there are different approaches to regulation in the two countries, the 
primary reason for disparity over the approval of rbGH is a result of differing interpretations 
of scientific evidence.  She argues that even though there was agreement about what the 
evidence demonstrated, the context in which it was reviewed, and the assumptions made by 
safety assessors, played a pivotal role in arriving at the two different conclusions to the 
regulation of rbGH. 
     The hormone rbGH is produced through rDNA technology.  Its purpose is to increase milk 
production in dairy cows, typically by ten to fifteen percent (Mills 7).  A number of risks to 
both human and animal health are associated with the use of rbGH.  Although there are 
always unknown risks with the products of rDNA technology, the debate about the safety of 
rbGH has centred around two primary concerns to human health.  The first concern is 
whether human health problems, in particular allergic reactions, were increased through the 
consumption of rbGH treated milk as opposed to the natural bGH already present in milk.  
The second concern is whether rbGH contributes to an increased cancer risk for those who 
consume milk from treated cows.  There is an elevated level of insulin-like growth factor-I 
(IGF-I) in the milk of treated cows and studies have shown that this hormone-like substance 
plays a role in the development of malignant tumours in humans (Mills 104).32  In addition to 
                                                 
     32 IGF-I mediates the action of growth hormone. 
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the issues of risks in human beings, the use of rbGH in cows is associated with an increase in 
common animal health problems such as mastitis, reproductive problems and lameness.33
     Assessments were conducted by Monsanto, the manufacturer, and submitted for review by 
government and university scientists in both Canada and the United States.  As with other 
technologies and their products submitted for regulatory review, assessors were required to 
use the data collected from animal and human health studies to determine whether 
statistically significant increases had any biological significance.  Mills argues that the debate 
over rbGH regulation was about the meaning of the data and not the data itself.  According to 
Mills, there was little to argue about over the numbers produced by the risk assessments, in 
fact there was a surprising amount of consensus over the data.  How to interpret those data 
however, was subject to much debate.  She claims that scientists had to make assumptions 
based on both existing dairy practices and on scientific knowledge in existing literature to 
answer questions about adequate levels of testing, interpretations of statistically significant 
results, acceptable levels of risk and ultimately, whether the data were sufficient to warrant 
approval (Mills 104). 
     In the case of human health concerns, Mills reports that FDA and Health Canada 
regulators agreed that the use of the drug did not pose a risk to human health based on 
conventional science.34  Human studies from the 1950s showed that the use of natural bGH to 
treat conditions such as dwarfism produced no ill effects.  Also, since rbGH is a protein 
hormone, protein digestion and absorption information in the scientific literature was used to 
assess the risk of consuming rbGH treated milk and to determine that long-term human health 
testing was unnecessary (Mills 143).  Mills notes that the decision not to proceed with long-
term human health testing was questioned by scientists at the Health Protection Branch 
                                                 
     33 Mastitis is an inflammation of a cow’s udder caused by a bacterial infection, which must be treated with 
antibiotics. 
     34 Mills defines conventional science as science that has been accepted by an established scientific 
community. 
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(HPB) of Health Canada since there had not been any empirical demonstration that rbGH 
would be unlikely to cause human health problems.  HPB scientists argued that more 
experimentation was required since rbGH is consumed over a lifetime and is a nontherapeutic 
drug with no benefits to consumers.  “However, external panels argued regulatory resources 
should not be used on low risk cases because absolute safety could never be achieved” (Mills 
7).  Despite the criticism by some regulatory scientists in Canada, and a few external critics in 
the United States, rbGH was found to pose no risk to human health and therefore, this 
conclusion was reported by both countries.  The decision to approve rbGH in the US and to 
reject its use in Canada therefore resulted from the differences in how each regulatory system 
addressed animal health concerns.   
     In the case of animal health, reviewers in both Canada and the US decided the problems in 
animal health data were statistically and biologically significant, however, the extent of this 
problem was assessed differently by scientists in the two countries (Mills 8).  Mills reports 
that the FDA considered the animal health effects manageable while Canadian regulators 
considered them to be severe and recommended rbGH be rejected for use by dairy producers.  
Mills attributes this disparity to both the political and economic situation that resulted in 
different assumptions scientists in each country made during the regulatory approval process. 
     Mills argues that the decision in the US was based on two major influencing factors.  First, 
she notes that the FDA considered the farmer to be ultimately responsible for managing 
animal health problems.  Moreover, the monitoring of drug residues in the milk supply was 
considered to be the responsibility of the monitoring institutions.  The reasoning behind this 
allocation of responsibility was, she claims, based on the fact that a successful farmer had to 
use various technologies (antibiotics and reproductive techniques) to manage existing animal 
health problems.  Therefore, the farmers should manage any new or increased health 
problems arising from the use of rbGH.  Second, Mill reports that during the time rbGH was 
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introduced, there was a push in the US to minimize government support for farmers which 
occurred concurrently with the trend to increase the global competitiveness of US agricultural 
products through the use of biotechnology.  “Under these conditions, rbGH represented a 
logical means to increase the productive efficiency of American agriculture and its capacity 
to compete in world markets” (Mills 10). 
     In Canada, by contrast, the responsibility for animal health problems fell to the regulators, 
and not the farmers.  In fact, the regulators were responsible not only for animal health but 
also for the viability of Canadian farms.  Therefore, the potential risks of rbGH to animal 
health were considered much more problematic in Canada than they were in the US.  Mills 
notes that increased disease rates in animals, which are treated with antibiotics, were of more 
concern in Canada because “if a milk tanker is found to contain an unacceptable level of 
antibiotic residues, the entire tanker of milk is disposed of and the farmer is responsible for 
the cost of the milk – up to $18,000” (9). If the tanker is disposed of to avoid this cost, then 
the farmer may not be able to meet their production quota (9).  The potential need to increase 
the use of antibiotics to treat the health problems associated with rbGH was therefore 
considered a risk to the animal, the farmer and the government.   
     Mills argues that the two different approaches to regulation in Canada and the US led 
researchers to conduct their reviews of rbGH with two different sets of assumptions.  She 
contends regulatory scientists depended on existing knowledge in this case and that they had 
difficulty questioning such knowledge within their respective regulatory structures (142).  
“The approval of the drug in the United States can best be explained as the result of a 
regulatory system in which the studies requested and the interpretation of the data was 
derived from a conventional scientific framework” (Mills 143). The reviewers’ expectations, 
decisions about which studies were required, and their interpretations of the data were all 
constructed by conventional science.  Past studies on the use of natural bGH and protein and 
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hormone digestion comprised the knowledge base from which reviewers made these 
decisions. Despite the consensus about the scientific issues involved, the context and 
assumptions made affected how scientists interpreted the data.  Mills claims the rbGH case 
demonstrates that the assumptions scientists make within their particular political 
environment can distort complex scientific information.  This instance in particular shows 
that the perceptions of the scientists  
are shaped by context in two different senses.  First, the goals and mandate of the 
institution in which the scientist operates exert a particular kind of pressure on him or 
her, thereby promoting or constraining particular types of choices.  Second, the 
broader political-economic context also affects scientists’ interpretations.  The two 
factors that were most significant here were the nature of the dairy system, and the 
significance of the biotechnology industry (Mills 5). 
 
      The decision to approve or reject rbGH for use on farms was one that affected not just 
farmers or Monsanto.  It affected a large part of society since the drug is used to increase 
production of such a commonly consumed product.  Regulators, using identical sets of data, 
determined the risk of rbGH was either acceptable or unacceptable depending on the 
assumptions they made during their assessments.  This case illustrates not only the 
significance of value assumptions in risk assessments, but also shows that they can play a 
pivotal role in determining the risks society will be exposed to.  Like the Alachlor case, Mills 
demonstrates that risk assessments are value-laden but she goes further to define what sort of 
circumstances or influences can determine the values scientists employ when attempting to 
determine the safety of a product.  She claims that “A conclusion about safety can only be 
informed by data, not determined by it, and it was this conclusion that was the source of 
dispute” (159).  This claim is particularly significant when considered in the context of the 
current Canadian regulatory system. 
     As discussed in Chapter Two, there has been a shift in the function of regulators from 
inspectors to auditors.  Regulators receive the proponent-produced risk assessments and 
assess the safety of a particular product based on this information.  This shift in function 
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suggests that the external value assumptions made during the assessment process are not 
taken into account by regulators.  Policy-makers do not consider the assumptions the 
regulators themselves make and thus there is a compounded value-ladenness to the 
information used to make decisions about biotechnology.   The rbGH case shows that there 
are many influences involved in the determination of risk.  It is not enough simply to assume 
that risk assessment is objective when making decisions about safety.  If there had been 
collaboration among scientists both externally and internally who operated under different 
sets of influences or within varying contexts, it is likely that the value assumptions would 
have had less of an influence on the decisions made by the regulators in both countries.  
Discussion within the broader scientific community might have produced a consensus among 
the regulators and would have contributed to the production of genuinely objective risk 
assessment. 
 
4.4  Genetically Modified Wheat 
 
     The different conclusions the American and Canadian regulators arrived at in the rbGH 
case become more significant when considered in conjunction with a more recent product 
from agricultural biotechnology submitted for approval to the CFIA.  Monsanto has 
developed a form of genetically modified wheat and has applied to the CFIA to assess its 
safety for its release onto the market.  The Alachlor case demonstrated that internal value 
assumptions occur and in fact are necessary in the risk assessment process.  Brunk, Haworth 
and Lee describe the influence these assumptions had in the outcome of the risk assessments 
concerning the safety of Alachlor.  The rbGH case shows the role external value assumptions 
play in the regulatory process specifically and how different background influences and 
pressures in Canada and the US led to different conclusions about the use of rbGH.   
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     Since the rbGH decision in 1999, Canada has entered into a bilateral agreement with    the 
United States concerning agricultural biotechnology.  In 1998, the CFIA, Health Canada and 
the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) agreed to attempt to harmonize those areas of the regulatory review process 
pertaining to the molecular genetic characterization of transgenic plants.  Additionally there 
was an agreement to “discuss and prioritize future areas of cooperation and information 
exchange that will facilitate the safe incorporation of transgenic plants into agricultural 
production and commerce” (Canadian Food Inspection Agency: “Canada and United States 
Bilateral on Agricultural Biotechnology”). 
     This agreement, along with the two previous case studies, is relevant to the events 
surrounding the introduction of GM wheat.  Although no decision has yet been made about 
whether or not it will be approved for use in Canada (since the case is still pending) the 
internal and external value assumptions made in producing risk data and during the 
regulatory review process will undoubtedly play an influential role in the decision.  The 
current regulatory regime does not adequately account for the value assumptions in risk 
assessment at either the level of data production by the proponent (internal level), or at the 
regulatory review level (external level) by those charged with ensuring the safety of the 
products of biotechnology. 
     In December 2002, Monsanto Canada Inc. submitted an application to the CFIA for the 
approval of its Roundup Ready® Wheat (RRW).35  This is wheat that has been genetically 
modified to be tolerant to glyphosate, which is the active ingredient in Monsanto’s herbicide 
marketed under the name Roundup®.  The impetus for introducing this modified wheat 
according to Monsanto is to “increase the competitiveness of wheat growers in the Northern 
Plains and provide a much-needed additional tool in weed control options and improved 
                                                 
     35 For an interesting account of the use of Roundup Ready® foods see Lappé and Bailey 50-62. 
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profitability for growers” (Monsanto).  Among some of the benefits, Monsanto claims that 
wheat growers of their new product would enjoy broad-spectrum weed control, increased 
crop safety, increased yield, cleaner grain, simplified weed management and a reduced 
environmental risk profile (Monsanto).   
     Among the controversies that have quickly arisen in response to Monsanto’s application to 
the CFIA, are concerns about the potential market acceptance due to fear of GM crops, 
particularly to export markets such as Europe.  Additionally, there has been much discussion 
over environmental concerns such as the potential for weeds to develop resistance to 
Roundup® through increased application, and the out of control spreading of volunteer 
wheat.36 Another potential risk identified by Van Acker and Entz, is the ability for GM wheat 
to turn into a nuisance if it cross-pollinates with goat grasses (Van Acker and Entz 174).37  It 
was thought that little or no cross-pollination occurs with wheat but this recent study has 
reported that there is a possibility that cross-pollination does in fact occur specifically with 
this type of grass.  
     The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), which represents the interests of the wheat growers in 
Canada, reports that upon consultation with a number of research scientists and extension 
agronomists throughout western Canada it was found that “the majority of the feedback is 
cautiously neutral to negative towards the introduction of RRW.  Many do not feel that the 
benefit of introducing RRW outweighs the agronomic costs and increased management risk” 
(Canadian Wheat Board: A Discussion Paper).  There was consensus among these experts 
that the “control of volunteer RRW is likely the single biggest issue of concern, and is 
believed by many to outweigh any potential benefits in agronomic performance and weed 
control” (Canadian Wheat Board:  A Discussion Paper).   
                                                 
     36 A volunteer is a plant that occurs as a result of seeds or propagative parts of plants growing uncontrolled 
from previous seeding or from plants escaped from cultivation that have been scattered by natural means.  These 
plants do not occur as a result of current seeding. 
     37 See Bartsch and Schmitz for a recent account of how GM plants are monitored once released. 
 71
     In Canada, the introduction of RRW faces opposition from a number of groups, most 
significantly, the Canadian Wheat Board but also the Saskatchewan Soil Conservation 
Association (SSCA), which has expressed concerns about the potential of RRW to cause 
environmental harm (Saskatchewan Soil Conservation Association).  Despite environmental 
risks, however, the CWB has focused much of its criticism on the economic risks widespread 
use of Monsanto’s new product might result in.  Farmers are concerned that they will lose 
money if the public refuses to buy products made with GM wheat.  There is also concern that 
the export market will avoid Canadian wheat because it is difficult to separate GM crops 
from non-GM crops.  On May 27, 2003, the CWB made a request to Monsanto to withdraw 
its application for the approval of its modified wheat from the CFIA.  In a letter addressed to 
Mr. Peter Turner, the president of Monsanto Canada Inc., the CWB stated that it  
 is extremely concerned that the unconfined release of RRW in Canada will result in 
significant and predictable economic harm to western Canadian farmers.  This harm 
will occur to those who adopt the technology and those who do not, as well as to 
others in the Canadian wheat value chain (Canadian Wheat Board). 
 
     This letter resulted in a swift response in the United States by its CWB counterparts.   The 
National Association of Wheat Growers and the Wheat Export Trade Education Committee 
(WETEC) jointly issued a statement on May 28, 2003 suggesting that the action of the CWB 
was contrary to science-based safety and health regulation principles.   
Market acceptance issues are extremely important, and must be addressed prior to 
commercialization of a biotech trait in wheat.  However, they do not belong in the 
context of a scientific safety review.  A favourable affirmation of safety through a 
purely scientific process is one piece of the market acceptance puzzle, and should 
serve to increase consumer confidence” (National Association of Wheat Growers). 
 
This incident illustrates a number of the problems I have identified with the presence of   
value assumptions in risk assessment and the lack of acknowledgement by those involved in 
the regulation of biotechnology.  The statement by the United States wheat producers 
emphasizing the need for science-based regulation and the determination of safety through a 
‘purely scientific’ process highlights the fact that there is an enduring view of objective risk 
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assessment and regulatory review.  Additionally, the controversy surrounding Monsanto’s 
application to the CFIA based on safety and economic risks, will serve as the background 
influence for regulators in both Canada and the United States.  As the circumstances in the 
rbGH case showed, the surrounding political climate had an effect on the assumptions 
assessors made during the regulatory review process.   
     The GM wheat case also involves the presence of value assumptions at the internal and 
external levels.  It reinforces the need to identify the internal value assumptions made by 
Monsanto scientists during their preparation of the requisite data.  As the developments in the 
Alachlor case showed, these assumptions can greatly influence the production of risk data 
and the interpretation of the conditions scientists must make judgements about in their risk 
reports. Given the current approach to regulation in Canada, it is questionable whether 
regulators acting as auditors will be able to identify the effect these assumptions might have 
on the risk data. 
     Second, this case will be affected by the surrounding controversy as occurred in the rbGH 
case.  The political, economic and corporate pressures under which regulatory scientists must 
work will influence the assumptions they must make to assess the safety of GM wheat.  The 
fact that there is disagreement between the Canadian and American wheat growers mimics 
the situation surrounding the regulation of rbGH.  In the case of RRW, however, regulatory 
decisions occur under the added influence of the bilateral agreement between the two 
countries, which was not a factor in the rbGH case.  On the one hand, the effect of this 
agreement might be very positive since the agreement provides the possibility for an 
expanded regulatory scientific community in which evidence can be reviewed.  Following 
Longino this is something I have argued previously that is necessary to produce objectivity in 
scientific endeavours.  On the other hand, however, it could result in additional pressure or 
influence on Canadian regulators by their American counterparts.  Therefore, the assumptions 
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Canadian regulators must make during the review process could be swayed by the larger, 
more powerful US industry.  The letter by the United States wheat growers in response to that 
of the CWB demonstrates that there already exist conflicting values in the discussion 
occurring externally from the regulation procedure.  This could have an impact on the 
regulators in Canada who must now keep in mind that market concerns should not play a role 
in their assessments, despite the contentions of the CWB, if they are to avoid criticism by the 
US for engaging non-scientific considerations in their assessments.  The bilateral agreement 
between Canada and the US contributes yet another external influence on regulatory risk 
assessment.   
     Thus the situation stands as follows.  The US regulators will produce their assessment of 
GM wheat with the US wheat growers expressing positive attitudes towards this product and 
anticipating the benefits it will have on their livelihood.  Canadian regulators, however, will 
produce their assessment with Canadian wheat growers expressing great concern and 
trepidation over the introduction of this product onto the market as well as environmental 
concerns as expressed by external scientists.  The presence of the bilateral agreement makes 
this case more complicated than cases like the regulation of rbGH because the effect of this 
attempt to globalize biotechnology safety was not a factor in the rbGH case.  
     A product like RRW requires a very careful assessment of risk since not only is wheat a 
very commonly grown crop in North America but it also comprises part of the diet of the vast 
majority of people.  Any potential health or environmental risks must be considered carefully 
before RRW is released onto the market.  Since it is such a common crop, and scientists have 
shown that wheat can cross-pollinate with wild grass, the results of the regulatory review will 
have widespread effects.  The Alachlor case and the rbGH case show that value assumptions 
are unavoidable and even necessary in both the production of risk data and its review.  The 
current climate surrounding regulation suggests that regulators, like those involved in the 
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rbGH case, will have a number of external and internal influences affecting the assumptions 
they make. The GM wheat case, although still pending, is useful in demonstrating the need to 
acknowledge and understand the role of value assumptions in risk assessment.  With this 
understanding, it is clear that genuine objectivity should be a goal of the assessment process.   
     Internal and external value assumptions shape much of the data produced by the scientists 
most closely involved with the development of GM wheat.  If these scientists were required 
to submit their results for peer review, or had their results compared with those conducted by 
independent risk assessors, risk data would be more genuinely objective than it is at present.  
The value assumptions that must be made in the production of data would not be limited to 
those directly involved in the research and thus would be more representative of the values 
that should be used to guide regulatory decisions that affect all members of society. 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
     In this chapter I have used three different case studies to describe ways in which risk 
assessment is value-laden.  The assumptions made by scientists and regulators are 
unavoidable and in fact, necessary.  They play an influential role in the decisions the 
Canadian government makes in the regulation of new technology, including biotechnology.   
Brunk, Haworth and Lee argue that the Alachlor case demonstrates not only that value 
assumptions occur in risk assessment, but that they are necessary in order to produce the data 
needed to understand how safe a certain product is and what sort of risks it might be 
associated with.  From their results it can be seen that values concerning market fairness and 
viability influenced the risk assessment conducted by Monsanto and the Review Board, 
which eventually indicated that Alachlor was safe.  In contrast, when values concerning 
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human safety were prevalent, as they were in the HPB, the risks of cancer associated with 
Alachlor use were considered too dangerous.   
     Assumptions about seemingly minor details such as the amount and quality of protective 
clothing worn by applicators, as well as whether their exposure should be amortized or not, 
were in fact not so minor to the assessment of risk.  The presence of value assumptions has a 
much more significant impact on risk data than is commonly thought, as this case shows.  
The effects of value-laden risk assessment are not, however, confined to the production of 
data or even to conclusions about safety.  The case of rbGH demonstrates that even the 
regulatory process itself is affected by the assumptions made both in the laboratory and 
during the review process. 
     Mills reports that the decision to reject rbGH in Canada while it was approved in the 
United States was directly influenced by the judgements made by regulatory scientists during 
the review process.  The political and economic environment within which each group of 
regulators functioned had an influence on which assumptions they made while reviewing 
rbGH.  She argues that the differences in the background conditions and, therefore, in the 
judgements made, resulted in the two differing decisions.  She claims that even though there 
was consensus among scientists about the evidence, it was the interpretation of this evidence 
that played a crucial role in this incidence.  Although Canadian and American reviewers 
decided there were significant problems with the animal health data, they differed in their 
assessment of the extent of the problem.   
     Since risk assessment involves both the production of evidence and its interpretation, the 
results of the Alachlor and the rbGH cases demonstrate two different aspects of value-
ladenness.  The case of GM wheat, although no regulatory decisions have been made yet, also 
provides a useful means of highlighting the problem with a regulatory system that does not 
adequately account for value assumptions.  Given the changes the Canadian system has 
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undergone in the last few years it is evident that although regulation relies on science-based 
risk assessment, it is still widely held that such assessment is objective (i.e., value-free) and, 
therefore, a good arbiter of technology and safety.  Risk assessment is a necessary part of 
determining the safety of biotechnology, however, it is problematic to assume that it is free 
from the influence of the values of those involved in its process.  This is evident in the 
Alachlor and rbGH cases.  Given the circumstances surrounding the regulation of GM wheat, 
it is clear that many of the same factors involved in the other two cases are occurring in this 
one, but with the added pressure of the new bilateral agreement.   
     Value-laden risk assessment is not objective, but we can move towards genuine objectivity 
in the enriched sense I discussed earlier through collaboration among the scientific 
community and increased peer review.  The emphasis placed on risk assessment to help guide 
the current approach to the regulation of biotechnology, in combination with the unique and 
far-reaching effects endemic to this technology, require a re-evaluation of Canada’s 
regulatory system.  As demonstrated in the discussion of these case studies, the values that 
influence assessments of risk are not adequately addressed.  This is the topic of my next and 
final chapter. 
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5. Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
     5.1 Introduction 
 
 
     In this final chapter, I discuss a number of implications of value assumptions in risk 
assessment.  I conclude that these assumptions do not need to compromise our attempts to 
produce genuine objectivity in assessments of biotechnological risks.  It is, however, 
necessary to discard the simplistic notion of objectivity in science and risk assessment, which 
I have criticized earlier, in favour of the view that objectivity is the result of social discourse 
and peer review. These assumptions have an impact on the decisions made concerning the 
implementation of biotechnological products in society.  I suggest three possible solutions 
that the Canadian regulatory regime could adopt in order to accommodate value-laden risk 
assessment while maintaining objectivity. 
     These suggestions will include the utilization of regulatory structures that are already in 
place but could be modified to address this problem, as well as the introduction of a new 
feature that could be incorporated into the regulatory system.  I conclude my thesis by 
explaining how the nature of risk, combined with the unique features of biotechnology and its 
regulation in Canada, all contribute to making it necessary not only to recognize value 
assumptions in risk assessment, but to demand an appropriate solution since their impact 
upon the risks taken and the risks faced by all members of society is much more significant 
than is currently thought.   
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     5.2 Recommendations 
 
5.2.1 Independent Review Board  
 
     The presence of value assumptions in the process of assessing risks has a considerable 
influence on the data used to determine regulatory policy concerning the use of 
biotechnology.  In the discussion of the three case studies in the previous chapter I have 
shown that determinations of safety are dependent on assumptions made about both 
experimental details and about the objectivity of science as a whole.  These assumptions 
occur at the two levels described at the beginning of Chapter Four.  Internal value 
assumptions are those that are made by scientists, which reflect the influences of their 
working conditions within the lab such as company goals or individual career motivations.  
External value assumptions reflect the influences on scientists from the surrounding 
community, political climate or public debates.  Despite ongoing controversy there is still a 
tendency to ignore or deny the presence of value assumptions by accepting an inadequate 
view of objectivity, which obscures the fact that assessments are influenced by value 
judgements.  As I have shown, this is problematic and results in an incomplete understanding 
of risk assessment.  In order to determine the safety of a technology, assessors must decide 
which parameters need to be included in the risk calculus and, therefore, value-ladenness is 
unavoidable. 
     The need for accurate risk assessments is not diminished since such assessments are often 
the only method available to determine how safe a new product or technology is.  The 
problem is not that assumptions must be made in the production of risk data, but that these 
assumptions, and their effect on decision-making, are often overlooked or ignored.  As 
Shrader-Frechette has argued, “risk assessment results are often viewed as far more objective 
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than they really are.  This, in turn, means that policy conclusions based on the assessment 
results are frequently more controversial and value-laden than is thought” (48). 
     Relying on objectivity in the attempt to navigate the biotechnological minefield of risks 
need not be problematic if the idea of objectivity is understood as a process.  Objectivity, as 
an ideal of inquiry, is unrealistic and holding on to this idea so tenaciously does a disservice 
to those attempting to address the risks associated with biotechnology.  Longino’s conception 
of objectivity as arising out of the process of peer review and discussion within the scientific 
community is particularly fruitful in its application to issues in biotechnology.  Subjecting 
risk assessments to the sort of debate and deliberation often surrounding other scientific 
endeavours allows for a re-examination of putative conceptions of biotechnological risks.  
Thus objectivity as an epistemic virtue is possible.  This enriched notion of objectivity allows 
for value-ladenness within the assessment of risk, but ensures that these values are not merely 
representative of a single group, individual or directive.  Failure to acknowledge that value 
assumptions are unavoidable makes risk assessments undesirably biased because only the 
values of a select few influence the outcome of these assessments.  Since biotechnology is an 
industry-driven undertaking and the industry produces risk assessments of their products for 
regulatory approval, the assumptions made in these assessments are typically those that 
reflect the interests of the industry.  These are not the values that should be the sole influence 
on the decisions the government makes about the risks society will face from biotechnology.  
     The idea of objectivity as a social construct also lends itself well to biotechnological risks 
since the assessment of such risks requires an interdisciplinary approach.  Nelkin and Pollak 
argue that the embodiment of highly controversial political and social values in risk 
assessments results in “requiring institutions and procedures that will allow an open and 
balanced dialogue and enhance the constructive sense of collective responsibility necessary 
for legitimate and acceptable decisions” (234). Collective responsibility could begin at the 
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level of risk assessment, thereby ensuring genuinely objective risk data on which to base 
regulatory decisions.  Debate about risk must occur if the problems endemic to assuming 
assessments are value-free are to be avoided.  Shrader-Frechette maintains that a good way to 
do this is to “pursue an adversary method of assessment, a method premised on the fact that 
desirable risk analyses are likely to be a product of rational interaction and compromise 
among those who disagree about how to evaluate a given risk” (205).  Recognizing that there 
may be adversarial relationships between various stakeholders in the knowledge game is 
crucial to the social responsibility of science as institution, which has an impact on the rest of 
society.  Objectivity must therefore be the outcome of a process of social discourse among 
players who cannot all be assumed to be in agreement about social aims and consequences. 
Longino’s account of objectivity as the product of social discourse, and Schrader-Frechette’s 
recognition of the necessity of an adversarial approach to risk assessment, together offer us 
the resources to address the issues specifically concerning biotechnology regulation in 
Canada. 
     My first recommendation for improving Canada’s regulation of biotechnology is to create 
an independent body to conduct risk assessment reviews, addressing value assumptions that 
occur at the internal level.  This review board would exist separately from agencies such as 
the CFIA or Health Canada, and would be responsible for reviewing the same risk data 
reports proponents currently submitted to these agencies for approval.  It would be comprised 
of a group of independent, non-industry funded scientists from a variety of scientific 
disciplines.  Having scientists from different disciplines is an important feature in this 
solution since assessment methodology and parameters vary greatly.  For example, it is less 
likely that the values invoked during the assessment process by a molecular biologist would 
be similar to those of a chemist.  The point at which these values come into play during the 
assessment process would also vary from one discipline to another, making their influence on 
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risk data much more evident.  The purpose of such a body would be to identify discrepancies, 
which would, if found, trigger closer examination and perhaps further consultation with the 
external scientific community.  Proprietary rights and confidentiality agreements would be 
adhered to unless there was a significant discrepancy in the findings of the independent 
review board and the respective government agency.  Then the proponent could choose either 
to withdraw its application for further study or re-evaluation, or release itself from it claims 
of privacy to become available for external examination.38   
     A second part of this particular recommendation addresses the issue of transparency.  
Many of the risks of biotechnology cannot be confined to one geographic area, population, or 
species—they affect all members of society.  Accordingly, current decisions about Canadian 
regulation emphasize the need for transparency.  This transparency occurs after regulatory 
decisions have been made.  Thus, at present, transparency as a tool for public involvement 
and participation is rendered ineffective because without significant public uproar, approved 
products are put onto the market with little resistance.  Considering a recent article in 
Maclean’s which reports that “Canadian biotechs have 17,000 new products in the pipeline”, 
it is difficult to imagine that anyone, let alone a largely uninformed public, would be able to 
keep track of which products have been approved or not (Leahy 42).   
     Therefore, in order to make the public and interested parties aware of the product there 
should be a public statement that a product has been approved for regulation.  Such 
statements are already required in the Canadian system, however, these requirements do not 
go far enough. Once a product has been approved by both the independent review board and 
                                                 
     38 I am aware that a company would rarely release its claims to privacy. I argue, however, that in issues of 
safety, public interests usurp the privacy claims of an unregulated technology or product.  In some cases, it is 
possible that external examiners could be held to privacy agreements themselves and thus enter into the 
regulatory system while maintaining the necessary autonomy required by external consultants.  This approach 
might also force the hands of corporations to produce a higher standard of risk assessment in order to avoid 
being subject to external examinations.  Claims of privacy should not be used to circumvent the stringent 
regulatory standards that are essential when attempting to introduce any product of biotechnology since we have 
such limited experience with their long-term effects.  This issue involves details of law, which I am not 
attempting to address here; I merely want to show that there are other ways to approach regulation. 
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the regulatory government agency, there should be a compulsory lag time in which risk data 
is made publicly available and all reports are subject to challenge by interested parties.  This 
would address value assumptions made at the external level of risk assessment.  Just as 
possessions to be auctioned off by the government must be announced publicly in the 
newspapers, biotech innovations tentatively approved for marketability should be announced 
and include a more thorough account of the risk data.  Transparency is only effective if it 
allows one to see the relevant inner workings of the regulatory system.  Currently members of 
society are asked to believe that risk reports of limited detail made public on government 
websites after the approval process has occurred is evidence of the transparency of regulation.  
This is clearly not the case. True transparency is essential to biotechnological regulation, 
otherwise we are left to imagine that the existing regulatory opacity is in fact, the 
transparency we demand in issues of safety.   
     Proponents might argue that publishing risk data would potentially compromise their 
intellectual property rights.  In the case of biotechnology, however, I think the rights of 
citizens should outweigh those of the corporations.  Unlike other technologies or products 
like computer software or cars, GM products are living organisms that can propagate and 
interact with the environment.  Knowledge of their behaviour is limited at present.  Their 
effects put all members of society at risk and cannot be recalled or cleaned up if something 
goes wrong however unlikely that may be.  Therefore, regulators should require that relevant 
risk information is widely available to interested parties.  It may be argued that corporations 
may not agree to publish risk data because of the concern that technical information cannot 
be protected while maintaining transparency.  In a few instances, depending on the type of 
processes involved, this may be a concern.  In such cases, my recommendation would be to 
wait until the corporation has obtained patent or copyright protection before making risk data 
available to the public.  It is not effective to enforce strict regulations on products after a 
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disaster or unwanted incident occurs.  Corporations and scientists should not be able to 
determine, or largely influence, the risks that will be faced by everyone.  Similarly, members 
of the general public should not be able to halt the progress of transgenic science based on ill-
informed fears.  The role of regulators must be able to accommodate both corporate and 
public interests.    
     The creation of an independent review board, as well as more timely, and effective 
transparency, would help to address the problems of value-ladenness in risk assessment.  
Additionally, this recommendation would alleviate some of the problems in separating ethical 
issues from issues of risk.  The use of risk assessment to protect society necessarily 
incorporates normative considerations.  These considerations must be recognized as 
unassailable components of safety assessments, and they must be accessible to the society 
they are meant to keep safe.    
 
     5.2.2 Acknowledgment in CBAC reports    
   
     Public access to risk assessments is a necessity in the case of biotechnology.  Levidow and 
Carr note, “Although scientific fact-finding has always been value-laden, ‘risk’ controversy 
has made the constituent values more accessible to public scrutiny” (Levidow and Carr 30).  
My second recommendation makes use of this feature of risk assessment and the process of 
regulation in Canada.  There needs to be an explicit acknowledgement by the government 
that risk assessment is value-laden. 
     At present CBAC attempts to incorporate public opinion gathered through surveys into an 
ethical framework in which to set issues surrounding the use of biotechnology in Canada.39  
                                                 
     39 CBAC's mandate is outlined in Chapter 2.   
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The recommendations made in CBAC’s reports are ostensibly used to inform decisions made 
by the government.  It is not clear, however, to what extent CBAC’s publications actually 
affect these decisions.  The efficacy of this advisory committee is widely debated but I do not 
intend to elaborate on this discussion. The impetus behind including CBAC in my 
recommendations is based on an attempt to find practical solutions to the problem of value-
laden risk assessment and the lack of its recognition by utilizing existing programs, 
procedures or strategies already present in the Canadian regulatory system.  
Recommendations to completely reform or restructure Canadian regulations are of limited 
value since they are unlikely to be employed and easily dismissed as cost-ineffective and 
unmanageable.  Therefore, my second recommendation, although certainly not without its 
limitations, provides a way for current regulatory structures to be re-evaluated or altered in 
such a way as to accommodate the problem I have outlined.   Additionally, it addresses the 
problems of value assumptions at both the internal and external levels of risk assessment. 
CBAC provides an overall ethical framework for the use of biotechnology in Canada but this 
can and should be extended to include risk assessment.  Also, it provides the opportunity for 
the incorporation of public concerns and values. 
     The existence of CBAC reflects one of the most visible attempts by the government to 
address ethical issues in biotechnology and the widespread application of its products.  
CBAC perpetuates the separation of ethics from risk in practice, however.  Levidow and Carr 
argue that when the state separates risks from ethics, not only are both reduced to specialist 
tasks, but this “risk/ethics boundary encourages deference to the expert assessment of both 
safety regulators and professional ethicists” (40).  When considering the results of expert 
assessment in the Alachlor and rBGH cases, combined with the knowledge that risk 
assessment necessarily involves the incorporation of the assessors’ normative considerations, 
the continued separation of ethics and risk is problematic.  As I have argued, biotechnological 
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risks are widespread and far-reaching.  They affect all members of society and thus need to 
be conducted, or at least reviewed, in the public realm.  The task of regulators to provide 
objective, publicly accessible risk assessments is even more pronounced when one considers 
the following: 
A study of public perceptions of biotechnology in the US showed that 19 per  
cent of the people would definitely believe university statements about the risk of 
genetically altered organisms; only 4.0 per cent would believe the company  
making the product.  Such perceptions do not take into account the fact that  
university scientists are becoming increasingly linked into industry and their 
views on risks tend to converge with those of industry.  This is also true of some 
federal agencies, which are closely associated with the promotion of corporate 
interests (Juma 129). 
 
Value-ladenness in risk assessment is not merely an issue for scientists and regulators.  
Formal peer review, as I suggested earlier, is one way of addressing this problem but public 
review should also be included.  Public discussion of biotechnological risks can provide an 
informal review process.  Not all public opinions can be used of course, but dispelling the 
idealized view of objective risk assessment is a very useful way of compelling regulators to 
answer questions the public are asking.  The controversy over biotechnological risk “is not 
merely over scientific methodology, but also over social values…analytic assessors must help 
both educate the public and to amend, reformulate, and clarify risk assessment methods” 
(Shrader-Frechette 203). 
     Since CBAC attempts not only to inform government policy but also to inform the public, 
I think its role needs to be expanded to include a more developed and explicit mention of 
guidelines governing risk assessment.  By additionally providing a forum of risk assessment 
procedures in biotechnology amongst experts, it would be able to address questions of risk 
assessment both in a theoretical and a practical sense.  Distally it would allow for the 
evaluation of theoretical implications of value assumptions in risk and practically, it would 
provide a means of solving the problems associated with them.  From a conceptual point of 
view, the inclusion of risk assessment in CBAC’s ethical framework would provide much 
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needed public recognition that risk assessment is not value-free and that risk cannot be 
separated from ethics.  This recognition would also reinforce the need for peer reviewed risk 
data and a more accountable system of regulatory control.  For example, CBAC provides a 
list of the elements it includes in its ethical framework, which encompasses the use of 
biotechnology.  I think one or two statements in this list acknowledging that risk data is 
value-laden are necessary.  CBAC could also include a requirement that companies must 
submit their data for peer review during the regulatory process.  Since CBAC has no 
legislative authority, however, changes to the way regulation is conducted must occur at the 
federal level.  CBAC reports recommend strategies to the government so it is difficult to 
predict whether major changes to its mandate would have any real effect on regulation.  
Including an acknowledgement of value assumptions in risk assessment, however, would at 
least bring the issue to the attention of those with the power to change regulatory policies.  It 
would also bring the issue to the attention of the public since CBAC reports provide the most 
accessible means of information about biotechnology regulation to those without scientific 
training.  Although this recommendation seems insignificant since it only involves the 
inclusion of value-laden risk assessment in CBAC reports, I think it is an important step to 
dispelling the idea of objectivity in the assessment of risk and our reliance on this untenable 
notion. 
 
5.2.3 Changes to Canadian regulation strategies 
 
    In concluding my discussion of recommendations, I wish to briefly broach the subject of 
Canada’s present approach to regulation in general.  As I have indicated earlier, there has 
been a shift towards regulators taking on the more passive role of auditors rather than the 
traditional, more hands-on role of inspectors, according to Prince.  This development is 
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unfortunate.  It serves to exacerbate the problems brought about by a failure to recognize that 
risk assessment is inherently value-laden.  Although adopting the role of auditors is appealing 
in its cost-effectiveness, the consequences of failing to recognize the complexity of safety 
assessments outweigh the economic benefit.  In fact, this shift suggests that either the 
Canadian regulatory system does not recognize that value assumptions are an integral part of 
risk assessment, or that those who set regulatory policy do not give them the appropriate 
consideration.  The policy of having proponents fill out a risk assessment data report 
carefully compiled through consultation with international agencies is inadequate to address 
important problems inherent in conducting these assessments.  In preparing reports 
proponents must still make assumptions, which will influence the character of the data they 
produce, as we have seen in the Alachlor case. 
     Having regulators act in the capacity of auditors of risk data is a poor policy from an 
epistemic point of view because it does not allow for the incorporation of value perspectives 
from other interested parties.  It also makes it much more difficult for regulators to address 
their concerns over how the data are produced since this would require making additional 
demands on proponents.  As Mills pointed out in her work on the rbGH case, regulators are 
under many pressures, including time constraints and the reluctance of the regulatory system 
to overburden proponents. 
     Although shifting the role of regulators increased the efficiency of regulation by making it 
quicker and more cost-effective, auditing should just be a preliminary step in the process.  A 
more effective process would be to subject assessment data to a random scientific re-
evaluation by regulatory scientists.  Randomly choosing one feature or category of data to 
undergo thorough methodological analysis by regulators keeps costs down and requires 
proponents to ensure good scientific practice since it would be unknown which aspect of their 
data would be subject to this more stringent review.  Specific questions concerning the 
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assumptions made by proponents governing their risk assessments should be required.  This 
way, proponents would be required to keep account of any assumptions they make during 
assessment and justify those assumptions.  Regulators would be able to put risk data in the 
context of the assumptions made by corporate scientists. Corporations might then be 
compelled to include risk assessments from independent scientists in order to provide 
regulators with more objective information about the safety of their products.  Subjecting 
these reports to the review board I mentioned in my first recommendation would mitigate the 
effect industry-biased value assumptions might have had were they left unchecked.  
     Finally, I wish to address Canada’s approach to regulation.  At present, this country 
focuses on a product-based rather than process-based system of regulation.  Thus, the trigger 
for regulation in Canada is not the use of rDNA technology or techniques per se, but rather, 
the presence of a novel trait that or is not substantially equivalent to a product already 
approved for regulation.   
     Given the unique risks inherent to the products and processes of biotechnology this 
approach is not adequate.  Recombinant DNA technology is sufficiently risky and relatively 
new and, therefore, warrants special consideration in regulation.  Canada’s product-based 
system, combined with the regulators acting in the capacity of auditors, suggests the 
regulatory system places much value on being industry-friendly.  Regulation occurs in the 
context of industry promotion.  Cranor suggests that since experts embed moral choices in 
epidemiological surveys, criteria for risk assessment should be adjusted relative to particular 
contexts (Cranor 126).  Canada’s product-based approach was suggested by industry 
proponents in the European Community but as Levidow notes, this “proposal implied that 
any hazards could be objectively identified by knowing the genetic composition of a GMO, 
likewise, the proposal could more readily portray risk assessment as ‘objective’ by restricting 
the relevant uncertainties to available scientific knowledge” (Levidow 187).  
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     Obviously the issue of a product-based system is accompanied by a much broader debate 
than I have included here.  Having an industry-friendly regulatory system, or even one that is 
product-based for whatever reason, does not necessarily need to be problematic.  In fact, a 
product-based system can produce good risk assessments if it is strengthened in certain ways 
such as the accompaniment of a system that acknowledges value-ladenness in risk 
assessment, and the view of objectivity as a result of peer review and communication.  The 
criticisms of both product- and process-based systems can be addressed if these measures are 
taken.  As I have argued, many of the problems associated with risk assessment and 
regulation stem from the untenable notion of objectivity in scientific endeavours and thus in 
risk assessment.  I have discussed how many of these problems can be ameliorated by the 
recognition that risk assessment is not value-free but can be made less problematic through 
social discourse and the resultant enriched understanding of objectivity.  In the context of the 
Canadian system of regulation, current changes to the system necessitate the employment of 
these strategies to avoid the unwanted consequences of an industry-friendly regime of 
regulation.  These changes might allow the release of biotechnological innovations based on 
value-laden risk data.  It is clear that, at present, the values informing risk assessment are 
those of the industry and the regulators.  The values influencing risk assessments should be 
those that reflect the values of society and not only proponents of the technology.  Objective 
risk assessment must be used in a science-based system of regulation.   The risks associated 
with rDNA technology demand an increased level of regulatory control since they cannot be 
recalled or cleaned up when something goes wrong.   
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
   I have argued in this thesis that value assumptions are endemic to risk assessment.  Risk 
always involves normative assumptions and therefore assessments of risk include such 
assumptions as well.  Science is not objective in the sense that it is not value-free and since 
risk assessment is a scientific endeavour, it is not objective in this sense either.  Therefore, 
not only is risk subject to the influences of background assumptions and values, but our 
quantitative assessments of their severity are subject to such assumptions as well.   
     Rescher argues that negativities are incommensurable and thus there are three major 
difficulties in relying on risk assessment information to understand the severity of risk.  The 
problem of determining the magnitude of a risk, of the possible negativities an action might 
produce, and the lack of a common unit of currency with which to compare different types of 
risks all contribute to the difficulty in relying on risk assessments to inform our understanding 
of risky behaviour, actions or situations.  Despite these difficulties, risk assessment continues 
to be widely perceived as a scientifically objective practice and thus a good arbiter of risk 
debate over the use of a number of technologies, products and processes in society.   
     The fact that risk assessment involves scientific techniques and results in the production of 
‘pure’ data serves to reinforce the view that it is objective.  As I have argued, however, the 
notion of objective science, or value-free science is untenable.  Science is dependent on the 
assumptions that must be made in the production of any information.  The positivist 
caricature of objectivity must be rejected in favour of the acknowledgement of the important 
role value assumptions play in science from the questions that we want to be answered, to the 
very production of the data we used to answer them.  It is appealing to hold onto the view that 
science is objective and value-free because if it is,  
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it can arbitrate between competing views about social policy options by 
demonstrating which ones imposed the greatest costs or risks upon the society and 
which ones generate the greatest compensating benefits; and it can do so by appealing 
to empirically demonstrable data and scientific principles universally accepted across 
a pluralistic society (Brunk, Haworth and Lee 235).  
 
Since risk assessment is scientific, it too is considered objective and therefore free from 
normative considerations.  As Putnam, Kuhn, Longino and many others have argued, 
however, science is observer-dependent and value-laden through and through.  Thus, when 
risk assessors, government agencies and society rely on the objectivity of science, and 
therefore risk assessment, “what is essentially a value-laden political decision becomes 
disguised as politically and morally neutral” (Brunk, Haworth and Lee 245).  The information 
relied on to guide decisions about which risks to face should be neutral information because it 
is used to restrict the liberties of individuals and corporations.  The government in turn is 
expected to provide protection from new technologies for the general populace and the 
environment while also protecting the interests of corporations, institutions and individuals.  
Objective scientific risk assessment is supposed to provide this neutrality but, as I have 
argued, it cannot.   
     If it is understood that science is not objective in the positivist sense, identifying it as the 
product of social knowledge can enrich the understanding of objectivity.  Objective science is 
dependent on the degree to which it withstands criticism from the scientific community, as 
Longino argues.  It is then possible to have genuinely objective risk assessment to inform 
regulatory decisions.  Risk assessment can also be subject to peer review and extensive 
debate within the scientific community.  The value assumptions that are part of risk and risk 
assessment would not compromise their effectiveness or usefulness when making decisions 
about new technology such as biotechnology.  If it is understood that such assumptions are a 
necessary part of the assessment process, then they can be identified and incorporated into the 
reports produced by assessors.  These reports would then be scrutinized or subject to 
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extensive peer review within the scientific community thereby reducing the influence of 
particular value assumptions which may not be shared by everyone in regulatory decision-
making. 
     In Chapter Three I gave a brief overview of biotechnology and the special type of risks 
associated with it.  Due to the nature of risks associated with biotechnology, their temporal 
and geographical extent, and the fact that since transgenic science is so new there is very little 
existing knowledge with which to anticipate the effects of biotechnological products, 
regulators rely even more heavily on risk assessments for transgenic products than with any 
other technology.  The need for objective risk assessment, therefore, is even more pressing in 
biotechnology fields particularly since experience with these organisms is limited and the 
long-term consequence of their release into the environment cannot be accurately anticipated. 
Combined with these problems is the very influential role industry has played so far in the 
progress of biotechnology and the existence of the biotechnology-industry complex.  The 
development of transgenic science has been concurrent with the development of the biotech 
industry, which has become the major driving force of biotechnology both as a business and 
as a scientific discipline.  The existence of this complex compounds the problems associated 
with relying on objective risk assessment to inform regulatory decisions because it adds the 
very influential interests of industry proponents to both the assessment of risk and to the 
process of regulation.  Industry interests shape the progress of the science, the risks that get 
measured, and regulations, yet all of this occurs under the notion that science, risk assessment 
and therefore regulation, is objective.   
     The Canadian system of regulation is science-based and relies on risk assessments of new 
technologies like transgenic science to inform policy about its use and products.  Despite the 
importance risk assessment has in regulation, the Canadian system is operated under the 
assumption that risk data is objective.  There is no acknowledgement of the value 
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assumptions that are made in the production of risk data.  Since 1997, the regulatory 
functions of a number of departments were consolidated into six primary departments while 
at the same time there was shift in the role of regulators from inspectors to auditors as noted 
by Prince.  The CFIA maintains that assessments of risk occur within the confines of its 
offices however I find this notion problematic given a proper understanding of risk 
assessment.   
     As Schrader-Frechette explains, risk assessment occurs in three parts, risk identification, 
risk estimation and risk evaluation.  The government determines the risks that corporations 
must measure, and then it evaluates the data those corporations submit with their application 
for regulatory approval.  The corporate scientists and not the government scientists however, 
conduct risk estimation.  Therefore, risk assessment is currently a collaborative effort by both 
the government and the corporation.  Value assumptions are made at all three stages and thus 
corporate interests influence the data produced by risk estimation yet they go unrecognized 
by the government.  Having regulators act as auditors of risk estimation data exacerbates the 
problems with value-ladenness because they have no way of identifying which assumptions 
are being made, and at what point during the risk estimation process they become 
incorporated.  Regulatory decisions, then, are based on industry-biased information despite 
the fact that the forms the corporate scientists must fill out in their applications are produced 
and audited by the regulatory scientists.  The regulatory scientists also make value 
assumptions in their assessment of the data submitted by the proponents in their 
determinations of a product’s or technology’s safety.  These two levels of value assumptions, 
both the internal and external, are integral to the process of risk assessment and to the 
regulatory system based on it.     
     In Chapter Four I identified two different levels of value assumptions that occur in risk 
assessments.  The assumptions an individual scientist must make in the laboratory while 
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conducting the risk estimation portion of risk assessment occurs at the internal level.  Internal 
assumptions were made throughout the Alachlor case as reported by Brunk, Haworth and Lee 
and resulted in significant disparity in the results of the assessments conducted by the HPB 
and Monsanto.  Regulatory scientists working for the HPB made assumptions that produced a 
worst-case scenario that was biased in favour of human health concerns while the 
assumptions Monsanto scientists made were biased in favour of the economic concerns of the 
corporation.   
     External assumptions were made throughout the rbGH case as reported by Mills.  We saw 
that political, economic, and job pressures led to the disparity in the conclusions of the 
Canadian and American regulators despite the consensus about the actual data they based 
their conclusions on.  American scientists placed the majority of the responsibility for animal 
health and monitoring of drug residues in the milk supply on the farmers.  Additionally, 
government support for farmers in the US was being minimized while their global 
competitiveness was being increased through the use of agricultural biotechnology.  In 
Canada on the other hand, the responsibility for animal health and drug residues in the milk 
supply fell to the regulators and there was no push to improve the competitiveness of 
Canadian farmers through the use of biotechnology.   
     Assumptions made at either the internal or external levels are not seen to compromise the 
objectivity of the risk assessments used in regulatory decisions.  Therefore, industry-biased 
value-laden data produced during risk estimation is used by regulators who themselves make 
politically, economically or individually biased value-laden decisions concerning the 
regulatory approval of the products of biotechnology.  The opportunity for socially 
constructed objectivity is absent since there is no acknowledgment of the assumptions being 
made at either the internal or external levels or risk assessment.  The current developments in 
the regulatory process of GM wheat are evidence of this fact.  This case also shows that even 
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in the most recent of cases, value assumptions are being made at both the levels I have 
described yet they are not addressed specifically.  It is plausible to assume Monsanto 
scientists, in the production of the risk data submitted to the CFIA, have not made internal 
value assumptions since the corporation publicly espouses the benefits of GM wheat to 
wheat-growers and consumers.  Similarly, external assumptions have been made by company 
scientists and will be made by regulatory scientists who are aware of the controversy 
surrounding the introduction of GM wheat.  Not only can they not escape the public concerns 
regarding economic, environmental and health risks, but they are also under the added 
pressure of maintaining the bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States, as 
well as the possible uproar of the Canadian and American wheat growers.   
     Much of the debate surrounding GM wheat could be alleviated if we adopted regulatory 
policies, which reflect the enriched notion of objectivity I have described.  Economic risks 
are significant because they affect the livelihoods of individual farmers, consumers and 
society.  If Canadian farmers are uncompetitive with American or European farmers for 
instance, then the whole of Canadian society suffers.  Rather than depending on the ‘purely 
scientific’ process of regulation the American wheat growers use to argue against Canadian 
concerns of economic risks associated with this new product, such concerns could be 
incorporated into the regulatory process.  Objectivity arrived at through social discourse 
within the scientific community would not be compromised by incorporating the concerns of 
economic and financial risks in risk assessments.  Since I have argued risk assessment is 
value-laden, it makes sense to include such concerns rather than to limit the values involved 
to the corporation scientists and regulators. 
     Whose values should be informing risk assessment and regulatory decisions?  As I have 
described, the risks of biotechnology cannot be confined to the laboratory or a certain area or 
population.  Transgenic organisms transcend geographical, political and physical boundaries 
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because they have the capacity to reproduce, crossbreed and disperse themselves in the 
environment.  Since risk assessments must be relied upon to determine the safety of these 
organisms, and risk assessment is value-laden, then ideally the values of all those who will be 
affected must be involved in both risk assessment and regulation.  This is impossible in 
practice, however, since not every person can be asked for his or her opinion, we cannot trust 
that every person’s opinion is informed, all of these opinions cannot be incorporated into a 
coherent course of action since they would vary widely from individual to individual. 
Objective risk assessment and regulation must be relied upon to inform decisions of the use 
of transgenic organisms.   
     Genuine objectivity is a result of broad debate and peer review and policies reflecting this 
conception of objectivity could allow the ongoing use of risk assessment in the regulation of 
biotechnology while addressing the value assumptions that are endemic to it.  At the internal 
level, peer review could be confined to those most qualified to conduct scientific 
assessments.  Therefore, the production and assessment of risk data would still occur within 
the confines of the scientific community, but it would not be limited to the proponents and 
regulatory scientists.  This information would be subject to peer review by scientists in a 
number of disciplines from a number of settings and would not be submitted to regulators 
until a consensus had been reached.  Value assumptions made at the external level of risk 
assessment could be addressed by having regulatory decisions open to public debate, thus 
subject to an informal peer review.   
     In the previous section of this chapter, I outlined three recommendations that could be 
implemented to address the problems with value-laden risk assessment.  When risk is 
understood to necessarily involve judgements, it follows that risk assessment is also value- 
laden.  The unique nature of the risks associated with biotechnology and its products, the co-
evolution of transgenic science with industry, the enormous economic benefits of 
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biotechnology and the shift in the role of regulators from inspectors to auditors in the 
Canadian regulatory system, all compound the problems with assuming that scientific risk 
assessment is objective.  Regulatory decisions, which involve the loss of liberties by members 
of society, must be based on neutral information and so it is not wrong to rely on risk 
assessment to aid in the determination of which risks we will face as a collective.  It is 
necessary, however, to understand objectivity as the product of extensive discussion and peer 
review.  Therefore, the values that are involved in the risk assessment of biotechnology are 
not confined to those of a scientific nature nor are they confined to a particular group or 
agency.  Opening the process of risk assessment to both the scientific community to address 
internal value assumptions, and to the public to address external value assumptions, enhances 
the ability to produce risk data that is objective.  Objective risk assessment is a good arbiter 
of risk debate.  In the case of biotechnology regulation, objectivity is perhaps even more 
strategic to determinations of safety since the risks we face from transgenic products are 
mostly unknown or unpredictable.  This is a new science and there has been limited 
experience with not only its long-term effects, but also with the interaction transgenic 
organisms have in the environment.  Once released, these organisms typically cannot be 
recalled or cleaned up.   
     Biotechnology includes environmental, health, economic, cultural, societal, and political 
risks.  It also provides an unprecedented tool to solve some of the most persistent and 
devastating problems that must be faced such as famine, genetic disease, lack of resources, 
poverty, health problems, environmental degradation and pollution.  Reaction to possible 
risks should not be based on unconvincing evidence or unfounded fears.  The interests of 
corporations should not be allowed to determine which risks will be measured or what is an 
acceptable level of risk.  Care must be taken to avoid relying on objective scientific risk 
assessment, which I have argued, is not genuine.  Decisions concerning the safety of 
 98
biotechnology should be open to broad debate and include risks of many types not only to 
make risk assessment genuinely objective and thus a useful tool, but also to address the 
concerns of as many of the people who will ultimately be left to face these risks. 
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